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    The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis

    The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis by Dhami, Sanjit;

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    A beszerzés időigényét az eddigi tapasztalatokra alapozva adjuk meg. Azért becsült, mert a terméket külföldről hozzuk be, így a kiadó kiszolgálásának pillanatnyi gyorsaságától is függ. A megadottnál gyorsabb és lassabb szállítás is elképzelhető, de mindent megteszünk, hogy Ön a lehető leghamarabb jusson hozzá a termékhez.

    A termék adatai:

    • Kiadó OUP Oxford
    • Megjelenés dátuma 2016. november 3.

    • ISBN 9780198715535
    • Kötéstípus Puhakötés
    • Terjedelem1798 oldal
    • Méret 246x189x61 mm
    • Súly 2936 g
    • Nyelv angol
    • Illusztrációk Numerous Figures and Tables
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    Kategóriák

    Rövid leírás:

    This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout.

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    Hosszú leírás:

    This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout. It is divided into nine parts and 24 chapters:

    Part I is on behavioral economics of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The evidence against expected utility theory is examined, and the behavioral response is outlined; the best empirically supported theory is prospect theory.

    Part II considers other-regarding preferences. The evidence from experimental games on human sociality is given, followed by models and applications of inequity aversion, intentions based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity.

    Part III is on time discounting. It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory.

    Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory.

    Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics.

    Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition.

    Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.

    Part VIII considers behavioral welfare economics; the main topics are soft paternalism, and choice-based measures of welfare. Finally, Part IX gives an abbreviated taster course in neuroeconomics.

    It is many years since the subject of African economic development has been treated with the best insights and methods that modern social science has to offer. Cramer, Sender, and Oqubay have set a new standard in this respect.

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    Tartalomjegyzék:

    Preface
    Introduction
    Part I: Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity
    Introduction to Part I
    The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
    Behavioral Models of Decision Making
    Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory
    Human Behavior Under Ambiguity
    Part II: Other-Regarding Preferences
    Introduction to Part II
    The Evidence on Human Sociality
    Models of Other-Regarding Preferences
    Human Morality and Social Identity
    Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences
    Exercises
    Part III: Behavioral Time Discounting
    Introduction to Part III
    The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice
    Behavioral Models of Time Discounting
    Applications of Present Biased Preferences
    Exercises
    Part IV: Behavioral Game Theory
    Introduction to Part IV
    The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice
    Models of Behavioral Game Theory
    Exercises
    Part V: Behavioral Models of Learning
    Introduction to Part V
    Evolutionary Game Theory
    Models of Learning
    Stochastic Social Dynamics
    Appendices and Exercises
    Part VI: Emotions
    Introduction to Part VI
    Emotions and Human Behavior
    Interaction Between Emotions and Cognition
    Exercises
    Part VII: Bounded Rationality
    Introduction to Part VII
    Judgment Heuristics
    Mental Accounting
    Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets
    Exercises
    Part VIII: Behavioral Welfare Economics
    Introduction to Part VIII
    Behavioral Welfare Economics
    Exercises
    Part IX: Neuroeconomics
    Introduction to Part IX
    Neuroeconomics
    Appendix on Game Theory
    Introduction
    Normal form games
    A basic taxonomy of some normal form games
    Two person zero sum games
    Selection criteria among Nash equilibria: Payoff dominance and Risk Dominance
    Extensive form games
    Games of incomplete information
    Correlated equilibrium

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