The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis

The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis

 
Publisher: OUP Oxford
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Product details:

ISBN13:9780198715535
ISBN10:0198715536
Binding:Paperback
No. of pages:1798 pages
Size:246x189x61 mm
Weight:3 g
Language:English
Illustrations: Numerous Figures and Tables
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Short description:

This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout.

Long description:
This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout. It is divided into nine parts and 24 chapters:

Part I is on behavioral economics of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The evidence against expected utility theory is examined, and the behavioral response is outlined; the best empirically supported theory is prospect theory.

Part II considers other-regarding preferences. The evidence from experimental games on human sociality is given, followed by models and applications of inequity aversion, intentions based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity.

Part III is on time discounting. It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory.

Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory.

Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics.

Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition.

Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.

Part VIII considers behavioral welfare economics; the main topics are soft paternalism, and choice-based measures of welfare. Finally, Part IX gives an abbreviated taster course in neuroeconomics.

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Table of Contents:
Preface
Introduction
Introduction to Part I
The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
Behavioral Models of Decision Making
Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory
Human Behavior Under Ambiguity
Introduction to Part II
The Evidence on Human Sociality
Models of Other-Regarding Preferences
Human Morality and Social Identity
Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences
Exercises
Introduction to Part III
The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice
Behavioral Models of Time Discounting
Applications of Present Biased Preferences
Exercises
Introduction to Part IV
The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice
Models of Behavioral Game Theory
Exercises
Introduction to Part V
Evolutionary Game Theory
Models of Learning
Stochastic Social Dynamics
Appendices and Exercises
Introduction to Part VI
Emotions and Human Behavior
Interaction Between Emotions and Cognition
Exercises
Introduction to Part VII
Judgment Heuristics
Mental Accounting
Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets
Exercises
Introduction to Part VIII
Behavioral Welfare Economics
Introduction to Part IX
Neuroeconomics
Introduction
Normal form games
A basic taxonomy of some normal form games
Two person zero sum games
Selection criteria among Nash equilibria: Payoff dominance and Risk Dominance
Extensive form games
Games of incomplete information
Correlated equilibrium