The Epistemology of Disagreement
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2013. április 25.
- ISBN 9780199698370
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem282 oldal
- Méret 241x162x21 mm
- Súly 574 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
The Epistemology of Disagreement brings together essays from a dozen philosophers on the epistemic significance of disagreement; all but one of the essays are new. Questions discussed include: When (if ever) does the disagreement of others require a rational agent to revise her beliefs? Do 'conciliatory' accounts, on which agents are required to revise significantly, suffer from fatal problems of self-defeat, given the disagreement about disagreement? What is the significance of disagreement about philosophical topics in particular? How does the epistemology of disagreement relate to broader epistemic theorizing? Does the increased significance of multiple disagreeing agents depend on their being independent of one another?
John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan, Thomas Kelly, and Brian Weatherson all weigh in with attacks on conciliatory views or defenses of non-conciliatory approaches. David Christensen and Stewart Cohen take up the opposite side of the debate. Bryan Frances, Sanford Goldberg, and Ernest Sosa discuss a kind of disagreement that will be of particular concern to most readers of this book: disagreement about philosophy. And Robert Audi, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Jennifer Lackey tackle some general theoretical issues that bear on disagreement.
The philosophers represented here include some who have contributed actively to the disagreement literature already, as well as some who are exploring the issue for the first time. Their work helps to deepen and expand our understanding of some epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful believer's engagement with other believers.
There is much to love in these essays, and much work still deserves to be done. Read this important collection and put your hands to the oars.
Tartalomjegyzék:
List of Contributors
Introduction
Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists
A. For Steadfastness
Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts
Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
B. For Conciliation
Epistemic Modesty Defended
A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View
Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy
Philosophical Renegades
Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion
Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions?
Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of Disagreement
Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements
Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter
Index
