Rethinking Moral Status
-
10% KEDVEZMÉNY?
- A kedvezmény csak az 'Értesítés a kedvenc témákról' hírlevelünk címzettjeinek rendeléseire érvényes.
- Kiadói listaár GBP 91.00
-
43 475 Ft (41 405 Ft + 5% áfa)
Az ár azért becsült, mert a rendelés pillanatában nem lehet pontosan tudni, hogy a beérkezéskor milyen lesz a forint árfolyama az adott termék eredeti devizájához képest. Ha a forint romlana, kissé többet, ha javulna, kissé kevesebbet kell majd fizetnie.
- Kedvezmény(ek) 10% (cc. 4 348 Ft off)
- Kedvezményes ár 39 128 Ft (37 265 Ft + 5% áfa)
Iratkozzon fel most és részesüljön kedvezőbb árainkból!
Feliratkozom
43 475 Ft
Beszerezhetőség
Becsült beszerzési idő: A Prosperónál jelenleg nincsen raktáron, de a kiadónál igen. Beszerzés kb. 3-5 hét..
A Prosperónál jelenleg nincsen raktáron.
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
A beszerzés időigényét az eddigi tapasztalatokra alapozva adjuk meg. Azért becsült, mert a terméket külföldről hozzuk be, így a kiadó kiszolgálásának pillanatnyi gyorsaságától is függ. A megadottnál gyorsabb és lassabb szállítás is elképzelhető, de mindent megteszünk, hogy Ön a lehető leghamarabb jusson hozzá a termékhez.
A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2021. augusztus 5.
- ISBN 9780192894076
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem352 oldal
- Méret 240x164x24 mm
- Súly 692 g
- Nyelv angol 184
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
Scientific and technological advancements have allowed us to create beings that blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings, which challenge our assumptions about moral status. This volume explores our responses to these challenges and reflects on ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the "full" moral status that is usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, which is usually ascribed to machines and other artifacts. These implicit assumptions have long been challenged, and are now coming under further scrutiny as there are beings we have recently become able to create, as well as beings that we may soon be able to create, which blur the distinctions between human, non-human animal, and non-biological beings. These beings include non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings.
There are a number of ways we could respond to the new challenges these technological developments raise: we might revise our ordinary assumptions about what is needed for a being to possess full moral status, or reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. This volume explores such responses, and provides a forum for philosophical reflection about ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
This book does not simply leave open ended philosophical questions but offers a rich array of argued answers to address real problems of the immediate future relevant not only to those specifically concerned with the problem of moral status, but to moral and political philosophers and in general to anyone who wants to investigate more profoundly the relationship between technology and society.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status
Section I. The Idea of Moral Status
Suffering and Moral Status
An Interest-Based Model of Moral Status
The Moral Status of Conscious Subjects
Moral Status, Person-Affectingness, and Parfit's No-Difference View
The Ever Conscious View and The Contingency of Moral Status
Moral Status and Moral Significance
Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics: On Androids, Sentience and Personhood
Is Moral Status Good for You?
Section II. Specific Issues about Moral Status
Toward a Theory of Moral Status Inclusive of Nonhuman Animals: Pig Brains in a Vat, Cows versus Chickens, and Human-Nonhuman Chimeras
Revisiting Inexorable Moral Confusion About the Moral Status of Human-Nonhuman Chimeras
Chimeras, Superchimps and Post-persons: Species Boundaries and Moral Status Enhancements
The Weak Connection between Moral Status and Legal Status
How the Moral Community Evolves
Moral Status of Brain Organoids
How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve?
Monkeys and Moral Machines
Sharing the World with Digital Minds
