Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe by Legault, Roch; Mckercher, B.J.C.;

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A termék adatai:

Kiadó Praeger
Megjelenés dátuma 2000. december 30.
Kötetek száma Hardback

ISBN 9780275961589
Kötéstípus Keménykötés
Terjedelem oldal
Méret 234x155 mm
Súly 454 g
Nyelv angol

Kategóriák

Politika általában, kézikönyvek Elméleti hadtudomány Politika általában, kézikönyvek (karitatív célú kampány) Elméleti hadtudomány (karitatív célú kampány)

Hosszú leírás:

This study offers a new perspective on the origins of the Second World War by comparing and contrasting military planning in seven nations in the two decades before 1939 (and, in the case of the United States and Soviet Russia, before 1941). Developing themes over time and across military cultures allows the authors to provide a comparative framework in which to survey how military planning and foreign policy were interwoven and how these connections produced divergent national strategies in the context of differing nationalities, military organizations, and societies. The contributors to this volume have consciously employed a wide interpretation of military history by emphasizing the interplay of social, political, diplomatic, and economic factors with military concerns, as well as the relationship between war and society.

For example, the German army developed its concept of blitzkrieg by examining military theory generated within the General Staff before 1918, and by considering the new political circumstances in which the Weimar state and its Nazi successor found themselves as a result of the Versailles Treaty. Despite its ultimate success, the German concept was merely abstract and theoretical until the combined use of armor and air power was employed effectively in Poland in the autumn of 1939 and in Western Europe during the spring of 1940. In contrast, the French defensive strategy built around the use of the Maginot Line was illustrative of a mainly defensive foreign policy, while British appeasement policy reflected the diminished level of military preparedness that was possible throughout the 1930s.

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Tartalomjegyzék:

Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War by Gordon Martel
Reluctant Neutral: Italy and the Strategic Balance in 1939 by Alan Cassels
The Weimar Roots of German Military Planning in the 1930s by Robert M. Citino
Weaknesses in French Military Planning on the Eve of the Second World War by Henry Dutailly
British Military Planning by Sebastian Cox
Jedi Knights in the Kremlin: The Soviet Military in the 1930s and the Genesis of Deep Battle by Roman Johann Jarymowicz
American War Plans by Steven Ross
Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War by Sidney Aster
Bibliography
Index

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