Institutional Investor Activism by Bratton, William; McCahery, Joseph A.;

Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation

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A termék adatai:

Kiadó OUP Oxford
Megjelenés dátuma 2015. augusztus 20.

ISBN 9780198723943
Kötéstípus Puhakötés
Terjedelem816 oldal
Méret 246x178x42 mm
Súly 1352 g
Nyelv angol

Kategóriák

Menedzsment, vállalatirányítás Pénzügy, befektetés

Rövid leírás:

Over the past two decades, activist investors have begun to play an increasingly important role in corporate governance around the world. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves.

Több

Hosszú leírás:

The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies.

More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value.

This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.

Bratton and McCaherys edited volume addresses todays most fundamental question regarding the governance of dispersed-ownership corporations: have private equity and activist hedge funds solved the problem of the separation of ownership from control? This remarkable collection of essays by the worlds leading corporate governance scholars will play a critical role in shaping the discussion in both academic and policy circles for many years to come.

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Tartalomjegyzék:

Introduction
Part I. The Disempowered Shareholder
The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise
Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective
Part II. Hedge Fund Activism
A. Patterns and Policy Questions - Dark Sides and Light Sides
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds
B. Ownership Stakes, Operating Results, and Financial Returns
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes Focus Fund
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
C. Strategic Holding versus Collective Interest: Empty Voting and Bankruptcy Reorganization
Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Corporate Governance and Systemic risk Implications
Common Pools, Common Disasters and the Anti-Commons: Hedge Fund Activity in Corporate Reorganizations
Hedge Funds and Chapter 11
Part III. Private Equity and Corporate Governance
A. Structure and Motivation
Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity
B. How has Private Equity Performed?
Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited
Part IV. The Regulatory Framework
A. Structural Treatment of Hedge funds and Private Equity: Investor Protection and Systemic Risk
Hedge Fund Regulation and Governance
The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation
Recasting Private Equity Funds after the Financial Crisis: The End of 'Two and Twenty' and the Emergence of Co-Investment and Separate Account Arrangements
B. Regulation and the Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Activism
The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access
C. Law Reform: the Burden of Persuasion
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment