The Collegial Phenomenon
The Social Mechanisms of Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2001. szeptember 6.
- ISBN 9780199242726
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem358 oldal
- Méret 242x164x24 mm
- Súly 645 g
- Nyelv angol
- Illusztrációk 14 figures and nymerous tables 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
This book examines cooperation among rival partners in a Northeastern US corporate law firm. Members are portrayed as interdependent entrepreneurs who build social niches in their firm, and both cultivate and mitigate status competition among themselves. This behaviour generates informal social mechanisms that help a flat organization to govern itself. The resulting theory of the collegial organization generalizes its results to partnerships, larger multinational professional services firms, and collegial pockets in flattening bureaucracies.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
Organizations performing non-routine, innovative, often knowledge- intensive tasks - for example professional partnerships - need a rather flat, collegial, and non - bureaucratic structure. This book examines cooperation among partners in a US corporate law firm and provides a grounded theory of collective action among rival peers, or collegiality. It is first network study of such a frim. Members (partners and associates) are portrayed as independent entrepreneurs who build social niches in their organization and cultivate status competition among themselves. This behaviour allows them to fulfil their commitment to an extremely constraining partnership agreement and generates informal social mechanisms (bounded solidarity, lateral control, oligarchic regualtion) that help a flat organization govern itself: maintain individual performance, even for tenured partners; capitalize knowledge and control quality; monitor and sanction opportunistic free-riding; solve the 'too many chefs' problem; balance the powers of rainmakers and schedulers; and integrate the firm in spite of many centrifugal forces.
These mechanisms and the solutions they provide are examined using a broadly-conceived structural approach combining theory-driven network analysis, ethnography of task forces performing knowledge-intensive work, and analysis of management and internal politics in the firm. Emmanuel Lazega presents a theory of the collegial organization which generalizes its results to all kinds of partnerships, larger multinational professional services firms, and collegial pockets in flattening bureaucracies alike.
Lazega's book is original and insightful through his rich field-specific knowledge, a theoretically refined and undogmatic approach, and through sophisiticated data collection and analysis. This book is clearly written.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction
A Structural Theory of Collective Action Among Peers
Spencer, Grace, & Robbins
Niches and Status in the Firm: A Specific Exchange System
Economic Performance and Quality Control
Too Many Chefs?
Balance of Power and Organizational Integration: A Montesquieu Structure
Pressuring Partners Back to Good Order: A Lateral Control Regime
Multi-Status Oligarchs and the Negotiation of Precarious Values
Conclusion
