The Abstract and the Concrete: Further Essays in Ontology
 
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ISBN13:9780192870452
ISBN10:0192870459
Kötéstípus:Keménykötés
Terjedelem:240 oldal
Méret:240x160x18 mm
Súly:1 g
Nyelv:angol
700
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The Abstract and the Concrete

Further Essays in Ontology
 
Kiadó: OUP Oxford
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Rövid leírás:

The Abstract and the Concrete draws together Peter Van Inwagen's essays in ontology from the last decade. They range over topics in meta-ontology, the author's distinctive version of platonism, mathematical fictionalism, analyticity, and colour.

Hosszú leírás:
The Abstract and the Concrete presents nine essays in ontology by Peter van Inwagen. Three of the essays concern topics in meta-ontology: the idea of multiple modes of being; Carnap's idea that the questions of "ontology," insofar as they are meaningful at all, are questions about which linguistic frameworks it is expedient to employ; the concept of one object's being metaphysically more fundamental that another. Three of the essays concern various topics that pertain to the author's "lower-case" or "lightweight" platonism. (According to lightweight platonism, there are attributes-necessarily existent universals. These attributes are not constituents of substances, they cannot enter into causal relations, and it is false that an F object is F in virtue of instantiating the attribute of being F.) The remaining three essays examine proposed answers to particular ontological questions: the question of the validity of mathematical fictionalism; the question whether it is analytic that at any place at which some xs are arranged chairwise, there is there a chair; the question of what it means to say that colour is an illusion, and whether (in the sense determined) colour is an illusion.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Modes of Being and Quantification
The Neo-Carnapians?
Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration
In Defense of Lightweight Platonism
Two Problems for a Truth-Centered Ontology
In Defense of Transcendent Universals
Fictionalist Nominalism and Applied Mathematics
Against Analytic Existence Entailments
Color is an Illusion