Product details:
ISBN13: | 9780192870452 |
ISBN10: | 0192870459 |
Binding: | Hardback |
No. of pages: | 240 pages |
Size: | 240x160x18 mm |
Weight: | 1 g |
Language: | English |
700 |
Category:
The Abstract and the Concrete
Further Essays in Ontology
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Date of Publication: 7 May 2024
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Short description:
The Abstract and the Concrete draws together Peter Van Inwagen's essays in ontology from the last decade. They range over topics in meta-ontology, the author's distinctive version of platonism, mathematical fictionalism, analyticity, and colour.
Long description:
The Abstract and the Concrete presents nine essays in ontology by Peter van Inwagen. Three of the essays concern topics in meta-ontology: the idea of multiple modes of being; Carnap's idea that the questions of "ontology," insofar as they are meaningful at all, are questions about which linguistic frameworks it is expedient to employ; the concept of one object's being metaphysically more fundamental that another. Three of the essays concern various topics that pertain to the author's "lower-case" or "lightweight" platonism. (According to lightweight platonism, there are attributes-necessarily existent universals. These attributes are not constituents of substances, they cannot enter into causal relations, and it is false that an F object is F in virtue of instantiating the attribute of being F.) The remaining three essays examine proposed answers to particular ontological questions: the question of the validity of mathematical fictionalism; the question whether it is analytic that at any place at which some xs are arranged chairwise, there is there a chair; the question of what it means to say that colour is an illusion, and whether (in the sense determined) colour is an illusion.
Table of Contents:
Modes of Being and Quantification
The Neo-Carnapians?
Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration
In Defense of Lightweight Platonism
Two Problems for a Truth-Centered Ontology
In Defense of Transcendent Universals
Fictionalist Nominalism and Applied Mathematics
Against Analytic Existence Entailments
Color is an Illusion
The Neo-Carnapians?
Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration
In Defense of Lightweight Platonism
Two Problems for a Truth-Centered Ontology
In Defense of Transcendent Universals
Fictionalist Nominalism and Applied Mathematics
Against Analytic Existence Entailments
Color is an Illusion