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  • Nature's Challenge to Free Will

    Nature's Challenge to Free Will by Berofsky, Bernard;

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    A termék adatai:

    • Kiadó OUP Oxford
    • Megjelenés dátuma 2012. január 5.

    • ISBN 9780199640010
    • Kötéstípus Keménykötés
    • Terjedelem290 oldal
    • Méret 240x162x23 mm
    • Súly 590 g
    • Nyelv angol
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    Rövid leírás:

    Bernard Berofsky argues that there is room in a deterministic world for a conception of free will as self-determination including the power of genuine choice. He grounds this compatibilist position in a new version of the regularity theory of laws, derived from David Hume's denial of necessary connections in nature.

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    Hosszú leírás:

    Hardly any attempt to come to grips with the classical problem of free will and determinism directly addresses the metaphysical vision driving the concerns of those who believe that a significant sort of free will cannot exist in a deterministic world. According to this vision of such a world, all events, including human decisions and actions, take place as they must because the world is governed by necessity. Most philosophers who believe that free will is possible in a deterministic world ignore this root position, often regarding it as sufficient to cite considerations about moral responsibility, human agency, or the prerequisites for a society.

    Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly. Nature's Challenge to Free Will offers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism. A Humean Compatibilist bases the belief in the compatibility of free will and determinism on David Hume's view that laws do not affirm the existence of necessary connections in nature. Berofsky offers a new formulation of Hume's position, given that, until now, there has been no acceptable version. His conclusion that free will is compatible with determinism is based as well upon a defense of the existence of psychological laws as autonomous relative to physical laws. He rejects appeals to the unalterability of laws (as in the Consequence Argument) on the grounds that this principle fails for psychological laws. Efforts to bypass this result by trying to establish that all laws are reducible to physical laws or that psychological states supervene on physical states are shown to fail. Berofsky concludes that the existence of free will as self-determination together with the power of genuine choice is not threatened even if we live in a deterministic world.

    In this rich and powerful book, Bernard Berofsky defends Humean compatibilism about free will and determinism, the view that freedom is compatible with determinism because the only reason to believe otherwise is based on the false metaphysics of necessitarianism . . . I recommend the book highly. Incompatibilists should take note.

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    Tartalomjegyzék:

    Introduction
    Concepts of Free Will
    Autonomy and Self-Determination
    Source Incompatibilism
    Conditionalist Compatibilism
    Causal Compatibilism
    The Consequence Argument and Determinism
    The Unalterability of Laws and the Reductionist Strategy
    Supervenience, Autonomy, and Physicalism
    The Regularity Theory I: Humean Supervenience
    The Regularity Theory II: Laws and Accidental Generalizations
    Free Will in a Deterministic World
    Acknowledgements
    Bibliography
    Index

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