Addiction and Weakness of Will
Sorozatcím: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry;
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2013. november 28.
- ISBN 9780199641963
- Kötéstípus Puhakötés
- Terjedelem160 oldal
- Méret 234x157x9 mm
- Súly 250 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This fascinating new book addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action
TöbbHosszú leírás:
The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours.
This thought-provoking new book presents an original philosophical analysis bringing together addiction and weakness of will. Within the book, the author develops an integrated account of these two phenomena, rooted in a classical conception of akrasia as valuing without intending and at the same time intending without valuing. This fascinating and suggestive account addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action.
Addiction and Weakness of Will makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. The book is valuable for philosophers, ethicists and psychiatrists with an interest in philosophy.
A dense and serious exploration of foundational issues in moral psychology, with an eye most especially on the conditions under which agents are morally responsible for akratic behaviour... Specialists in moral responsibility and moral psychology will benefit considerably from reading Radoilska's view, especially her sustained criticisms of accounts that currently dominate the landscape
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction: The Moral Philosophy of Addiction and Weakness of Will
Addiction and Voluntary Control
Wallace on Responsibility and Control
The Disparity of Actions and Attitudes
Responsibility for Addiction: Excuses and Exemptions
Actions and Omissions Revisited
Positive Moral Appraisal
Addiction and Rational Judgement
Smith on Responsibility for Attitudes
Responsible Irrationality
Conflicting Attitudes
Implications for Paradigm Cases: Patterns of Awareness and Wholehearted Attitudes
Is Responsibility Best Understood as a Cluster Concept?
Addiction and Agential Evaluative Stance
De Quincey: Confessions of an English Opium Eater
Dostoevsky: The Gambler
Weakness of Will and Moral Appraisal
Arplay on Responsibility in the Absence of Control
Standard Akrasia
Inverse Akrasia
Inept Burglar
Neoptolemus
Huckleberry Finn
Strength Versus Goodness of Will
Mizogushi
Before Weakness of Will
Holton on Weakness of Will
Aristotle on Akrasia
The Logical Form of Akrasia
The Blameworthiness of Akrasia
The Pre-Intentionality of Akrasia
Revisting Weakness of Will
Weakness of Will as a Failure to Resist Akrasia
Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account
Actions as Actualization
Success in Action and the Guise of the Good
Less than Successful Actions
Concluding Remarks:The Offspring of Akrasia
