The Matter of Consciousness
From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 2 March 2023
- ISBN 9780198840459
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages280 pages
- Size 240x162x23 mm
- Weight 594 g
- Language English 284
Categories
Short description:
Torin Alter makes a compelling case against the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. He argues that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument refutes all standard versions of physicalism, and leads to Russellian monism - the view there are intrinsic properties which both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics.
MoreLong description:
Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.
What can Mary know about the conscious experience of color from inside her black and white room, and what follows for the metaphysics of consciousness? Torin Alter gives a state-of-the-art analysis of these issues. He focuses especially on the crucial gap between structural and phenomenal aspects of reality, and articulates a powerful version of Russellian monism that traces this gap to a deep level of the physical world. Along the way he gives a definitive defense of anti-materialist arguments from objections old and new, shedding new light on this crucial nexus between consciousness, knowledge, and reality.
Table of Contents:
Part I: The case for the epistemic gap
Introduction
The significance of structure
Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance
Phenomenal knowledge without experience
Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge
Phenomenal representation
Part II: The case for the modal gap
Deduction and necessity
Epistemic-modal bridge principles
The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma
Consequences of social externalism
The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts
Part III: The case for the ontological gap
The supervenience requirement on physicalism
Two final objections
Two final objections
The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration
Conclusion
