• Contact

  • Newsletter

  • About us

  • Delivery options

  • Prospero Book Market Podcast

  • Propositions

    Propositions by Merricks, Trenton;

      • GET 10% OFF

      • The discount is only available for 'Alert of Favourite Topics' newsletter recipients.
      • Publisher's listprice GBP 75.00
      • The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.

        33 862 Ft (32 250 Ft + 5% VAT)
      • Discount 10% (cc. 3 386 Ft off)
      • Discounted price 30 476 Ft (29 025 Ft + 5% VAT)

    33 862 Ft

    db

    Availability

    printed on demand

    Why don't you give exact delivery time?

    Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.

    Product details:

    • Publisher OUP Oxford
    • Date of Publication 26 March 2015

    • ISBN 9780198732563
    • Binding Hardback
    • No. of pages248 pages
    • Size 208x141x22 mm
    • Weight 402 g
    • Language English
    • 0

    Categories

    Short description:

    Trenton Merricks presents an original argument for the existence of propositions, and defends an account of their nature. He draws a variety of controversial conclusions, for instance about supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts.

    More

    Long description:

    Propositions has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, Trenton Merricks draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts.
    An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. Propositions begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. Merricks then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. Instead, he argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions.
    Merricks defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. He thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions about what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent thing as being a certain way. Merricks then defends his own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.

    The book is very clearly and effectively written, with an impressively tight and lucid argumentative structure. The view of propositions defended is original, as is the approach to defending it. It is very focused in its aims and scope ... Propositions is ambitious and important: it presents a very original view which should become a real contender in metaphysical discussions over the nature of propositions.

    More

    Table of Contents:

    Acknowledgements
    Introduction
    Propositions and Modal Validity
    Logical Validity and Modal Validity
    Propositions Are Not Sets of Possible Worlds
    Against Structured Propositions
    Singular Propositions
    The Nature of Propositions
    References
    Index

    More
    0