Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?
Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 18 June 2009
- ISBN 9780199568239
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages354 pages
- Size 233x156x19 mm
- Weight 535 g
- Language English 0
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Short description:
If humans are purely physical, then must all our thoughts and actions be determined by the laws of neurobiology? Free will, moral responsibility, and reason itself appear to be in jeopardy. But Murphy and Brown present a non-reductive version of physicalism which leaves room for us to be (sometimes) the authors of our own thoughts and actions.
MoreLong description:
If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown here defend a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (sometimes) the authors of their own thoughts and actions.
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? brings together insights from both philosophy and the cognitive neurosciences to defeat neurobiological reductionism. One resource is a 'post-Cartesian' account of mind as essentially embodied and constituted by action-feedback-evaluation-action loops in the environment, and 'scaffolded' by cultural resources. Another is a non-mysterious account of downward (mental) causation explained in terms of a complex, higher-order system exercising constraints on lower-level causal processes. These resources are intrinsically related: the embeddedness of brain events in action-feedback loops is the key to their mentality, and those broader systems have causal effects on the brain itself.
With these resources Murphy and Brown take on two problems in philosophy of mind: a response to the charges that physicalists cannot account for the meaningfulness of language nor the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental. Solutions to these problems are a prerequisite to addressing the central problem of the book: how can biological organisms be free and morally responsible? The authors argue that the free-will problem is badly framed if it is put in terms of neurobiological determinism; the real issue is neurobiological reductionism. If it is indeed possible to make sense of the notion of downward causation, then the relevant question is whether humans exert downward causation over some of their own parts and processes. If all organisms do this to some extent, what needs to be added to this animalian flexibility to constitute free and responsible action? The keys are sophisticated language and hierarchically ordered cognitive processes allowing (mature) humans to evaluate their own actions, motives, goals, and rational and moral principles.
This volume is an impressive achievement on the part of Murphy and Brown. They have provided a much-needed synthesis of philosophical and scientific resources dealing with moral responsibility and free will.
Table of Contents:
Introduction: New Approaches to Knotty Old Problems
Avoiding Cartesian Materialism
From Causal Reductionism to Self-Directed Systems
From Mindless to Intelligent Action
How Can Neural Nets Mean?
How Does Reason Get Its Grip on the Brain?
Who's Responsible?
Neurobiological Reductionism and Free Will
Postscript
