The Measure of Mind
Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution
-
10% KEDVEZMÉNY?
- A kedvezmény csak az 'Értesítés a kedvenc témákról' hírlevelünk címzettjeinek rendeléseire érvényes.
- Kiadói listaár GBP 72.00
-
32 508 Ft (30 960 Ft + 5% áfa)
Az ár azért becsült, mert a rendelés pillanatában nem lehet pontosan tudni, hogy a beérkezéskor milyen lesz a forint árfolyama az adott termék eredeti devizájához képest. Ha a forint romlana, kissé többet, ha javulna, kissé kevesebbet kell majd fizetnie.
- Kedvezmény(ek) 10% (cc. 3 251 Ft off)
- Kedvezményes ár 29 257 Ft (27 864 Ft + 5% áfa)
Iratkozzon fel most és részesüljön kedvezőbb árainkból!
Feliratkozom
32 508 Ft
Beszerezhetőség
Megrendelésre a kiadó utánnyomja a könyvet. Rendelhető, de a szokásosnál kicsit lassabban érkezik meg.
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
A beszerzés időigényét az eddigi tapasztalatokra alapozva adjuk meg. Azért becsült, mert a terméket külföldről hozzuk be, így a kiadó kiszolgálásának pillanatnyi gyorsaságától is függ. A megadottnál gyorsabb és lassabb szállítás is elképzelhető, de mindent megteszünk, hogy Ön a lehető leghamarabb jusson hozzá a termékhez.
A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2007. június 28.
- ISBN 9780199211258
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem278 oldal
- Méret 240x161x18 mm
- Súly 589 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
In his The Measure of Mind, Robert J. Matthews provides a sustained critique of a widely held representationalist account of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes. He goes on to develop an alternative, more plausible measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them. This original work will be of considerable interest to scholars and graduate students working in the philosophy of mind and language.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
The Measure of Mind provides a sustained critique of a widely held representationalist view of propositional attitudes and their role in the production of thought and behaviour. On this view, having a propositional attitude is a matter of having an explicit representation that plays a particular causal/computational role in the production of thought and behaviour. Robert J. Matthews argues that this view does not enjoy the theoretical or the empirical support that proponents claim for it; moreover, the view misconstrues the role of propositional attitude attributions in cognitive scientific theorizing.
The Measure of Mind goes on to develop an alternative measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them. On this account, the sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is, in much the same way that we specify a quantity of some physical magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement scale, we specify propositional attitude of a given type by means of its representative in a linguistically-defined measurement space. Propositional attitudes turn out to be causally efficacious aptitudes for thought and behaviour, not semantically evaluable mental particulars of some sort. Matthews' measurement-theoretic account provides a more plausible view of the explanatorily relevant properties of propositional attitudes, the semantics of propositional attitude attributions, and the role of such attributions in computational cognitive scientific theorizing.
fascinating book...Robert Matthews pursues, with great rigour and tenacity, the question of how we should understand our practice of attributing propositional attitudes and, in particular, the specific questions of how subjects must be built (given the best available accounts of the building materials) if they are to serve as proper targets for that practice...I cannot do justice here to the detail and care involved in Matthew's presentation of his case.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Preface/Acknowledgments
A Prospective Introduction
Part I: The Received View and Its Troubles
The Received View
Troubles with the Received View
Are Propositional Attitudes Relations?
Part Two: A Measurement-Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution
Foundations of a Measurement-Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
The Basic Measurement-Theoretic Account
Elaboration and Explication of the Proposed Measurement-Theoretic Account
References
Index
