Seemings and Justification
New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP USA
- Megjelenés dátuma 2013. szeptember 19.
- ISBN 9780199899494
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem384 oldal
- Méret 163x236x38 mm
- Súly 680 g
- Nyelv angol
- Illusztrációk 7 illus. 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
You believe that there is a book (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings-at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence.
These considerations have prompted many to endorse some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism. These views hold that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P provides justification to believe P. The main difference is that dogmatism is restricted to some domain, often perception, and phenomenal conservatism is intended to apply to all seemings. Critics worry that such views run into problems with traditional Bayesianism and that they are too permissive, in part because of their implications regarding cognitive penetration.
The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. In addition to addressing each of these issues, this volume also addresses a wide range of related topics, including intuitions, the nature of perceptual content, access internalism, and the epistemology of testimony and disagreement.
Those who are interested in these topics should definitely read Tucker's book.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Contributors
Chapter 1: Seemings and Justification: An Introduction - Chris Tucker
Part I: Seemings and Seeming Reports
Chapter 2: Seemings and Semantics - Andrew Cullison
Chapter 3: Seeming Evidence - Earl Conee
Part II: Foundations of Dogmatism
Chapter 4: Immediate Justification, Perception and Intuition - Jessica Brown
Chapter 5: Problems for Credulism - James Pryor
Part III: Seemings and Epistemic Internalism
Chapter 6: Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma? - Matthias Steup
Chapter 7: Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism - Michael Bergmann
Part IV: The Significance of Seemings within Specific Domains
Chapter 8: Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Grounds of Justification - Robert
Audi
Chapter 9: Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness - Michael DePaul
Part V: Dealing with Cognitive Penetration
Chapter 10: Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the "Bad Basis" Counterexamples - Matthew McGrath
Chapter 11: Searching for True Dogmatism - Peter J. Markie
Chapter 12: Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism - Berit Brogaard
Part VI: Phenomenal Conservatism
Chapter 13: Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity - William G. Lycan
Chapter 14: Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism - Michael Tooley
Chapter 15: Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles - Michael Huemer
Index
