The Normative Web
An Argument for Moral Realism
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 6 September 2007
- ISBN 9780199218837
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages272 pages
- Size 240x160x20 mm
- Weight 566 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Many philosophers hold antirealist views about morality, according to which moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. By means of an analogy between moral and epistemic facts, Terence Cuneo presents a compelling defence of robust realism in ethics. In so doing, he engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.
MoreLong description:
Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.
In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.
Terence Cuneo, someone already identified by those who have been paying attention as a young moral philosopher to watch, has written a splendid book...an important and engaging contribution to the metaethical literature.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort
Defending the Parallel
The Parity Premise
Epistemic Nihilism
Epistemic Expressivism: Traditional Views
Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views
Epistemic Reductionism
Three Objections to the Core Argument
Bibliography
