Moral Error Theory
History, Critique, Defence
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 12 January 2017
- ISBN 9780198769972
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages224 pages
- Size 215x143x13 mm
- Weight 288 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
MoreLong description:
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. In Part I (History), he explores the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like J. L. Mackie's arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes the form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. In Part III (Defence), Olson considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. He ends his discussion with a consideration of the implications of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing.
For the most part, Olson is a lucid writer and it is refreshing to see a philosopher write candidly about the limitations of even his own arguments... the book will likely generate fruitful discussion for years to come. In particular, metaethicists will want to consider Olson's case for moral error theory in chs 5 through 9. Hume scholars might want to consider ch. 2, and those interested in metaepistemology may benefit from reading ch. 8.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
PART I: HISTORY
Hume: Projectivist, Realist, and Error Theorist
Hägerström: Projectivist, Non-Cognitivist, and Error Theorist
Other Precursors of Moral Error Theory
PART II: CRITIQUE
How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (I)
How to Understand Mackie's Argument from Queerness (II)
Debunking Moral Belief
PART III: DEFENCE
Ramifications of Moral Error Theory
Moral Error Theory, and Then What?
