Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
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40 131 Ft
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 30 October 2003
- ISBN 9780195159875
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages254 pages
- Size 169x240x22 mm
- Weight 603 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Randolph Clarke examines free will in the context of determinism on the one hand, and the notion that this choice may in fact be random and arbitrary on the other. In the first half of the book, he provides a careful, 'conceptual' assessment of the various libertarian theories that do not appeal to agent causation, and contends that they fail to provide an adequate account of the control required by free will. The second half is a development of his own theory of causation, where he suggests that a satisfactory account of this type of control is possible and necessary, constituting a significant advance in our understanding of free will and the moral responsibility that follows from it.
MoreLong description:
Randolph Clarke examines free will in the context of determinism on the one hand, and the notion that this choice may in fact be random and arbitrary on the other. In the first half of the book, he provides a careful, 'conceptual' assessment of the various libertarian theories that do not appeal to agent causation, and contends that they fail to provide an adequate account of the control required by free will. The second half is a development of his own theory of causation, where he suggests that a satisfactory account of this type of control is possible and necessary, constituting a significant advance in our understanding of free will and the moral responsibility that follows from it.
ibertarian Accounts of Free Will offers a careful, often insightful examination of the prospects for an adequate naturalist libertarian incompatibilism; the book examines, that is, theories of freedom under which free action is possible should determinism be false and should the world be as the natural sciences tell us it is. It is an excellent book that anyone interested in this topic should read.
