How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law by Westphal, Kenneth R.;

Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism

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Product details:

Publisher OUP Oxford
Date of Publication 7 April 2016

ISBN 9780198747055
Binding Hardback
No. of pages270 pages
Size 222x144x20 mm
Weight 432 g
Language English

Short description:

Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies. He argues that focusing on the differences between these two accounts occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which does not depend on moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism.

Long description:

Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies, the differences between which are prominent in current philosophical accounts. Westphal argues that focussing on these differences, however, occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a distinctive constructivist method to identify basic moral principles and to justify their strict objectivity, without invoking moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism. Their constructivism is based on Hume's key insight that 'though the laws of justice are artificial, they are not arbitrary'. Arbitrariness in basic moral principles is avoided by starting with fundamental problems of social coördination which concern outward behaviour and physiological needs; basic principles of justice are artificial because solving those problems does not require appeal to moral realism (nor to moral anti-realism). Instead, moral cognitivism is preserved by identifying sufficient justifying reasons, which can be addressed to all parties, for the minimum sufficient legitimate principles and institutions required to provide and protect basic forms of social coördination (including verbal behaviour). Hume first develops this kind of constructivism for basic property rights and for government. Kant greatly refines Hume's construction of justice within his 'metaphysical principles of justice', whilst preserving the core model of Hume's innovative constructivism. Hume's and Kant's constructivism avoids the conventionalist and relativist tendencies latent if not explicit in contemporary forms of moral constructivism.

In this forcefully argued contribution to the theory of justice, Kenneth R. Westphal looks back to Hume and Kant as reformers of an earlier "natural law" tradition ... This is history of philosophy done right, telling us what people thought some centuries ago, and why we should think the same. It is the admirable work of a mature thinker who is passionate about justifying principles of justice, and about why their justification matters.

Acknowledgements
Primary Sources and Citation Methods
Reconstructing Moral Constructivism
Objectivity, the Euthyphro Question, and Reconstructing Natural Law
Hume's Construction of Justice
Hume's Proof of the Insufficiency of Moral Sentiments
Kant's Moral Constructivism
Natural Law Constructivism and Rational Justification
Constructivism, Contractarianism, and Basic Obligations
Kant's Justification of Rights to Possession
Conclusion: Reintegrating Justice into Morals
Appendix
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index