Hard Luck
How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility
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Product details:
- Publisher Oxford University Press
- Date of Publication 27 November 2014
- ISBN 9780198709343
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages238 pages
- Size 215x141x12 mm
- Weight 294 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
The concept of luck plays an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility. It may seem that if our actions are not determined, they are too luck-based to be free. Neil Levy presents an original account of luck and argues that it undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
MoreLong description:
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more
vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection: historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck; non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable
difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for performing actions that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that
they do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
Neil Levys new book is a good read. ... Levys thesis is novel and refreshing, for it is intended to be independent of determinism or indeterminism.
Table of Contents:
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction
An Account of Luck
Luck and Libertarianism
The Luck Problem for Compatibilists
The Epistemic Dimensions of Control
Akratic Freedom?
The Retreat to the Inner Citadel
Quality Of Will Theories And History-Insensitive Compatibilism
Bibliography
Index
