Consciousness and Moral Responsibility
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 6 March 2014
- ISBN 9780198704638
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages174 pages
- Size 222x147x17 mm
- Weight 334 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the na?ve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.
MoreLong description:
Neil Levy presents an original theory of freedom and responsibility. Cognitive neuroscience and psychology provide a great deal of evidence that our actions are often shaped by information of which we are not conscious; some psychologists have concluded that we are actually conscious of very few of the facts we respond to. But most people seem to assume that we need to be conscious of the facts we respond to in order to be responsible for what we do. Some thinkers have argued that this na?ve assumption is wrong, and we need not be conscious of these facts to be responsible, while others think it is correct and therefore we are never responsible. Levy argues that both views are wrong. He sets out and defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues this account entails that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. We exercise sufficient control over the moral significance of our acts to be responsible for them only when we are conscious of the facts that give to our actions their moral character. Further, our actions are expressive of who we are as moral agents only when we are conscious of these same facts. There are therefore good reasons to think that the na?ve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true. Levy suggests that this entails that people are responsible less often than we might have thought, but the consciousness condition does not entail that we are never morally responsible.
Levy's systematic attention to definitional and interpretive detail, extended case studies, response to critics from multiple disciplines, and fine-grained argument make this volume a potential paradigm shifter in discussions involving moral agency. Excellent bibliography. Essential.
Table of Contents:
Preface
Does Consciousness Matter?
The Consciousness Thesis
The Global Workspace
What Does Consciousness Do?
Consciousness and the real self
Consciousness and control
Concluding thoughts
References
Index
