Between Universalism and Skepticism
Ethics as Social Artifact
- Publisher's listprice GBP 69.00
-
31 153 Ft (29 670 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 3 115 Ft off)
- Discounted price 28 038 Ft (26 703 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
31 153 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 5 May 1994
- ISBN 9780195086461
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages224 pages
- Size 241x161x22 mm
- Weight 555 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
This book defends a middle ground between the view that there is a set of moral standards binding on rational beings as such (universalism) and the view that, in the last analysis, differences in morals reduce to differences in personal preferences (Skepticism). Philips draws conclusions about the uses and limits of reason in ethics, and provides a theoretical basis for dealing with actual moral controversies and approaching problems in applied ethics.
MoreLong description:
Philips defends a middle ground between the view that there is a set of standards binding on rational beings as such (Universalism) and the view that differences in morals reduce ultimately to matters of taste (Skepticism).
He begins with a sustained critique of universalist moral theories and some familiar approaches to concrete moral questions that presuppose them (most appeals to intuitions, respect for person's moralities, and versions of contractarianism and wide reflective equilibrium). He goes on to criticize major recent attempts to develop non-universalist alternatives to skepticism, arguing that they rely on excessively abstract and philosophically indefensible preference satisfaction theories of the good.
According to Philips's positive alternative, moral standards are justified to the extent that they support reasonably valued ways of life. He devotes considerable attention to clarifying this idea and draws conclusions from it about the role and limits of reason in ethics. Philips's theory provides us with a theoretical basis for dealing with actual moral controversies and for approaching questions of applied and professional ethics in a systematic way.
The book is clearly written, and the arguments are presented in a straightforward manner. There is something here for everyone at the college and university level.
