Being Rational and Being Right
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 13 March 2020
- ISBN 9780198847717
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages240 pages
- Size 232x159x18 mm
- Weight 496 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Juan Comesa--a presents a new framework for understanding the rationality of action and belief, which he calls "Experientalism". Arguing that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief, Comesa--a provides a novel account of empirical evidence as consisting of the content of undefeated experiences.
MoreLong description:
In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesa--a argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesa--a provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesa--a calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesa--a embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesa--a's own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
MoreTable of Contents:
Introduction
Probability and Decision Theory
Objective Bayesianism and Knowledge-First Epistemolog
Knowledge-Based Decision Theory
Excuses, Would-Be Knowledge, and Rationality-Based Decision Theory
Experientialism
The Normative Force of Unjustified Beliefs
The Problem of Easy Rationality
Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Evidentialist Reliabilism?
Conclusion
