The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2018. június 21.
- ISBN 9780199657889
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem1102 oldal
- Méret 246x171 mm
- Súly 1839 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general.
Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction
Part I: The Structure of Reasons and Normativity
The Unity of Normativity
The Unity of Reasons
The Logic of Reasons
The Language of Ought, and Reasons
Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons
Part II: Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation
Internalism and Externalism about Reasons
Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons
Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons
Reasons and Action Explanation
1. Reasons and Ability
Part III: Reasons Fundamentalism
The Metaphysics of Reasons
Reasons Fundamentalism and Value
Reasons Fundamentalism and What is Wrong with It
Part IV: Reasons Explained
Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations
Constructivism about Reasons
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
Part V: Practical Deliberation
Practical Reasoning
Weighing Reasons
Underdetermination by Reasons
Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility
Part VI: Reasoning and Rationality
Reasons and Rationality
Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll's Regress Argument
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality
Part VII: Epistemic Reasons
The Place of Reasons in Epistemology
Reasons for Belief and Normativity
Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters
Part VIII: Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief
Reasons and Perception
Reasons and Testimony
Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
Part IX: Types and Sources of Reasons for Action
Instrumental Reasons
Teleological Reasons
Subjective and Objective Reasons
Prudential and Moral Reasons
Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Reasons
Reasons and Moral Principles
Part X: Reasons Difficult to Categorize
Reasons to Intend
Reasons and Emotions
Aesthetic Reasons
Part XI: Skepticism about Reasons
Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons
The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons
Part XII: Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind
Normativity and Concepts
The Normativity of Meaning
Normativity and Intentionality
