The False Promise of Superiority
The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War
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Why don't you give exact delivery time?
A beszerzés időigényét az eddigi tapasztalatokra alapozva adjuk meg. Azért becsült, mert a terméket külföldről hozzuk be, így a kiadó kiszolgálásának pillanatnyi gyorsaságától is függ. A megadottnál gyorsabb és lassabb szállítás is elképzelhető, de mindent megteszünk, hogy Ön a lehető leghamarabb jusson hozzá a termékhez.
A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP USA
- Megjelenés dátuma 2023. január 12.
- ISBN 9780197680865
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem288 oldal
- Méret 235x156x20 mm
- Súly 540 g
- Nyelv angol
- Illusztrációk 9 b/w line drawings; 2 tables 253
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
In this book, James H. Lebovic argues that the policy approach to maintain nuclear superiority did not make sense during the Cold War and makes even less sense now. As he shows, the idea that nuclear superiority is an imperative still serves as the foundation for too much strategic policy in an era where utility of such weapons is highly questionable. Moreover, continuing to rely on them as coercive tools rests on deficient logic and is dangerous. Not only explaining why we remain stuck with a nuclear stance that is largely irrelevant to the era, this book also offers a way out of the type of thinking that keeps such policies in place.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics.
During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.
James Lebovic's The False Promise of Superiority is a real breath of fresh air that makes a vital contribution to ongoing debates about nuclear strategy, especially the nature, meaning and significance of nuclear 'superiority.' Challenging approaches to nuclear strategy that rely on capabilities rather than intentions and real-world decision-making dynamics, Lebovic makes a compelling case that nuclear strategists and policy makers should focus on what potential adversaries are likely to do as opposed to what they can do. No one interested in the future of nuclear deterrence and strategy can afford to ignore this provocative and important book.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Concepts and Arguments
Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War
SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages
Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry
Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War
SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"
Chapter 4: Commitment
Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation
Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation
SECTION III: Case Studies
Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis
Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions
Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence
Notes
Index
