The Domain of Reasons
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2012. november 8.
- ISBN 9780199664672
- Kötéstípus Puhakötés
- Terjedelem558 oldal
- Méret 245x170x30 mm
- Súly 904 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
This book is about normativity and reasons. By the end, however, the subject becomes the relation between self, thought, and world. If we understand normativity, we are on the road to understanding this relation.
John Skorupski argues that all normative properties are reducible to reason relations, so that the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. This is a concept fundamental to all thought. It is pervasive (actions, beliefs, and sentiments all fall within its range), primitive (all other normative concepts are reducible to it), and constitutive of the idea of thought itself. Thinking is sensitivity to reasons. Thought in the full sense of autonomous cognition is possible only for a being sensitive to reasons and capable of deliberating about them.
In Part II of the book Skorupski examines epistemic reasons, and shows that aprioricity, necessity, evidence, and probability, which may not seem to be normative at all, are in fact normative concepts analysable in terms of the concept of a reason. In Part III he shows the same for the concept of a person's good, and for moral concepts including the concept of a right. Part IV moves to the epistemology and metaphysics of reasons. When we make claims about reasons to believe, reasons to feel, or reasons to act we are asserting genuine propositions: judgeable, truth-apt contents. But these normative propositions must be distinguished from factual propositions, for they do not represent states of affairs.
So Skorupski's ambitious theory of normativity has broad and deep implications for philosophy. It shows how reflection on the logic, epistemology, and ontology of reasons finally leads us to an account of the interplay of self, thought, and world.
Review from previous edition as historically rich as it is philosophically illuminating ... on a par with the most significant books on reasons, normativity and the mind published in recent years.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Preface
Synopsis
Introduction
Part One The Structure of Normative Concepts
Reasons
Indexicality, Universalisability and the Range of Reasons
Normativity
Warrant
Part Two Epistemic Reasons
The A Priori
Analyticity
Modality
Non-monotonic Norms
Part Three Evaluative and Practical Reasons
Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling and Will
Reasons and Feelings: (i) The Bridge Principle and the Concept of a Person's Good
Reasons and Feelings: (ii) Moral Concepts
Impartiality (i) The Principle of Good
Impartiality (ii) The Demand Principle
Moral Judgement and Feeling
Part Four The Normative View
The Epistemology of Reason Relations
The Ontology of Reason Relations
Rules, Norms and Concepts
Self and Self-Determination
The Critique of Reasons
Appendix: Symbols, Terms and Theses
References
Index
