Putting Metaphysics First
Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology
-
10% KEDVEZMÉNY?
- A kedvezmény csak az 'Értesítés a kedvenc témákról' hírlevelünk címzettjeinek rendeléseire érvényes.
- Kiadói listaár GBP 142.50
-
64 338 Ft (61 275 Ft + 5% áfa)
Az ár azért becsült, mert a rendelés pillanatában nem lehet pontosan tudni, hogy a beérkezéskor milyen lesz a forint árfolyama az adott termék eredeti devizájához képest. Ha a forint romlana, kissé többet, ha javulna, kissé kevesebbet kell majd fizetnie.
- Kedvezmény(ek) 10% (cc. 6 434 Ft off)
- Kedvezményes ár 57 905 Ft (55 148 Ft + 5% áfa)
Iratkozzon fel most és részesüljön kedvezőbb árainkból!
Feliratkozom
64 338 Ft
Beszerezhetőség
Megrendelésre a kiadó utánnyomja a könyvet. Rendelhető, de a szokásosnál kicsit lassabban érkezik meg.
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
A beszerzés időigényét az eddigi tapasztalatokra alapozva adjuk meg. Azért becsült, mert a terméket külföldről hozzuk be, így a kiadó kiszolgálásának pillanatnyi gyorsaságától is függ. A megadottnál gyorsabb és lassabb szállítás is elképzelhető, de mindent megteszünk, hogy Ön a lehető leghamarabb jusson hozzá a termékhez.
A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2010. január 7.
- ISBN 9780199280803
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem358 oldal
- Méret 241x163x25 mm
- Súly 704 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
Michael Devitt presents a series of essays with four recurring themes: (i) a sharp distinction between metaphysical issues and semantic ones; (ii) the priority of metaphysical issues over epistemological and semantic issues; (iii) a naturalistic opposition to the a priori taken largely from Quine; (iv) an uncompromising 'realism about the external world'. Topics include Plato's 'one over many' problem; nonfactualism; truth; moral realism; biological realism; biological essentialism; intuitions and their proper role.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
The metaphysical part of this book is largely concerned with realism issues. Michael Devitt starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious 'one over many' problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromising realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on an antirealism that is hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism.
The second part of the book is epistemological. Devitt argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate 'armchair philosophy' are emipirical not a priori.
Throughout the book there is an emphasis on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should 'put metaphysics first'. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy, and the linguistic turn in contemporary modern philosophy, were something of disasters.
Through these articles, Devitt has consistently done more than perhaps anyone else to clarify what is at issue generally in the realism debates and to provide the strongest possible defences of realism in a number of different domains. Both realists and antirealists owe him a lot for this important contribution. Devitt's writing also always moves heavyweight intellectual objects in a way that is always clear, accessible, and devoid of any unnecessary jargon or technicalities. I hope that, like his realist views, his style too will continue to influence young philosophers.
Tartalomjegyzék:
METAPHYSICS
"Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?
Postscript to "'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?"
Aberrations of the Realism Debate
Postscript to "Aberrations of the Realism Debate"
Underdetermination and Commonsense Realism
Scientific Realism
Postscript to "Scientific Realism"
Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics
Postscript to "Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics"
Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking
The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism
The Metaphysics of Truth
Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective
Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms
Resurrecting Biological Essentialism
EPISTEMOLOGY
Naturalism and the A Priori
No Place for the A Priori
Intuitions
On Determining What There Isn't
