Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility
Sorozatcím: Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law, and Philosophy;
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP USA
- Megjelenés dátuma 2013. március 7.
- ISBN 9780199925605
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem404 oldal
- Méret 162x241x29 mm
- Súly 726 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
Adopting a broadly compatibilist approach, this volume's authors argue that the behavioral and mind sciences do not threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility. Rather, these sciences provide fresh insight into human agency and updated criteria as well as powerful diagnostic and intervention tools for assessing and altering minds.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
How should neuroscience, psychology and behavioral genetics impact legal responsibility practices?
Recent findings from these fields are sometimes claimed to threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility practices by revealing that determinism, or something like it, is true. On this account legal responsibility practices should be abolished because there is no room for such outmoded fictions as responsibility in an enlightened and scientifically-informed approach to the regulation of society.
However, the chapters in this volume reject this claim and its related agenda of radical legal reform. Embracing instead a broadly compatibilist approach - one according to which responsibility hinges on psychological features of agents not on metaphysical features of the universe - this volume's authors demonstrate that the behavioral and mind sciences may impact legal responsibility practices in a range of different ways, for instance: by providing fresh insight into the nature of normal and pathological human agency, by offering updated medical and legal criteria for forensic practitioners as well as powerful new diagnostic and intervention tools and techniques with which to appraise and to alter minds, and by raising novel regulatory challenges.
Science and law have been locked in a philosophical dialogue on the nature of human agency ever since the 13th century when a mental element was added to the criteria for legal responsibility. The rich story told by the 14 essays in this volume testifies that far from ending this philosophical dialogue, neuroscience, psychology and behavioral genetics have the potential to further enrich and extend this dialogue.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Chapter 1
Introduction
Nicole A. Vincent
Chapter 2
Criminal Common Law Compatibilism
Stephen J. Morse
Chapter 3
What can neurosciences say about responsibility? Taking the distinction between theoretical and practical reason seriously
Anne Ruth Mackor
Chapter 4
Irrationality, mental capacities and neuroscience
Jillian Craigie and Alicia Coram
Chapter 5
Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self vs. 'Voluntariness' in the Law
Paul Sheldon Davies
Chapter 6
The Implications of Heuristics and Biases Research on Moral and Legal Responsibility: A Case Against the Reasonable Person Standard
Leora Dahan-Katz
Chapter 7
Moral Responsibility and Consciousness: Two Challenges, One Solution
Neil Levy
Chapter 8
Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the 'Folk': Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility
Katrina L. Sifferd
Chapter 9
Neuroscience, deviant appetites and the criminal law
Colin Gavaghan
Chapter 10
Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease?
Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Chapter 11
Addiction, choice, and disease: How voluntary is voluntary action in addiction?
Jeanette Kennett
Chapter 12
How may neuroscience affect the way that the criminal courts deal with addicted offenders?
Wayne Hall & Adrian Carter
Chapter 13
Enhancing Responsibility
Nicole A. Vincent
Chapter 14
Guilty Minds in Washed Brains?
Manipulation Cases, Excuses and the Normative Prerequisites of Liberal Legal Orders
Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel
