How to Be a Presentist
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP USA
- Megjelenés dátuma 2026. augusztus 17.
- ISBN 9780197845714
- Kötéstípus Keménykötés
- Terjedelem304 oldal
- Méret 242x164x27 mm
- Súly 540 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
In the last 100 years, since Einstein published his special theory of relativity, the standard view among physicists and philosophers has been as follows: (a) physical reality is a 4-dimensional spatiotemporal manifold in which time is the fourth dimension, (b) past and future objects like dinosaurs and Martian outposts exist in the same way that present objects like tables and rocks do, and (c) temporally distant regions of the 4-dimensional manifold (e.g., the Jurassic Period) are exactly analogous to spatially distant regions (e.g., the Outer Solar System). This book pushes back against this orthodox view and defends the commonsense view that (i) physical reality is a 3-dimensional spatial manifold, and (ii) past and future objects like dinosaurs and Martian outposts don't exist at all. In doing so, Mark Balaguer defends presentism—the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects. In How to Be a Presentist, Mark Balaguer defends presentism against numerous objections, most notably, the ontological-commitment objection, the truthmaking objection, and the special-relativity objection. More specifically, this book argues that (i) presentists can respond to the ontological-commitment objection by endorsing a very general and systematic error theory about much of our ordinary and scientific discourse about the past and future; that (ii) presentists can plausibly and defensibly respond to the truthmaking objection by rejecting the relevant truthmaking principles; and that (iii) presentists can respond to the special-relativity objection not by endorsing the existence of a privileged frame of reference but by relativizing their view.
In addition to defending presentism against objections, Balaguer argues for two other substantive theses. First, he argues for the metaphilosophical (and anti-metaphysical) view that the question of whether presentism is true is an ordinary empirical question about the nature of physical reality and that this question can't be settled by a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Balaguer argues that presentists should reject the existence of time, times (including the present time), and temporal passage. From this it follows that presentists should reject standard versions of the A-theory—which is surprising because it's widely believed that presentism entails the A-theory.
The version of presentism developed in this book is a metaphysically thin, ontologically parsimonious view that can be thought of as an ordinary empirical hypothesis—a profoundly different view from other versions of presentism in the literature.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction
PART I. METAPHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
Against Trivialism
Against Necessitarianism
Anti-Metaphysicalism
PART II. IN DEFENSE OF PRESENTISM
FAPP-ist Error Theory
Truthmaking I: Backing Presentists into a Nothingist Corner
Truthmaking II: Nothingism to the Rescue
Truthmaking III: What Makes the Counterfactuals of Chapter 5 True?
How to Make Presentism Consistent with Special Relativity
Time Travel and Change
PART III. METAPHYSICALLY MINIMAL PRESENTISM
Metaphysically Minimal Presentism: Or: Presentism Without Time, Without Temporal Passage, and Without the A-Theory
