Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice by Jong-A-Pin, Richard; Bjørnskov, Christian;

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The Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice offers a comprehensive and authoritative guide to the interdisciplinary field that bridges economics, political science, and philosophy. With contributions from leading scholars around the globe, this volume explores how incentives, institutions, and individual behavior shape collective decision-making in democratic and non-democratic contexts alike.

Covering foundational concepts such as constitutionalism, rational ignorance, rent-seeking, the median voter, and Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the Encyclopedia also delves into contemporary debates on algorithmic fairness, authoritarian populism, expressive choice, and the role of emotion in politics. It brings public choice theory to bear on issues ranging from corruption, fiscal federalism, and globalization, to political dynasties, constitutional design, and the decline of democracy, and documents the unique insights of the approach.

From classical models of strategic voting and collective action to emergent perspectives on behavioral asymmetries and belief consumption, this Encyclopedia illuminates the enduring relevance of public choice in understanding the mechanics of governance, power, policy, and political change.

Essential reading for researchers, students, and practitioners, this is the definitive reference for anyone seeking to understand the logic—and limits—of political decision-making.

Key Features:

• A diverse range of international experts
• Examines how economics and politics influence each other in real-world settings
• Provides forward-thinking insights into political behavior, corruption, election cycles and policy-making

This definitive Encyclopedia explores the core ideas of public choice theory, including rational choice, voting theory, and political budget cycles. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, entries cover both empirical, theoretical, and philosophical principles in the field. They explore how political incentives, institutional constraints, and voter behavior interact in contexts ranging from collective action, to democratic backsliding, to fiscal federalism and rent-seeking.

‘Public choice brings the tools of economics to bear on politics, and this Encyclopedia shows just how far that approach can take us. A rigorous and wide-ranging resource, it reflects the depth and diversity of a field still reshaping how we understand collective decision-making.’

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Contents
Preface xiv
1 Abstention 1
François Facchini and Louis Jaeck
2 Affect in public choice 9
Frans van Winden
3 Algorithmic fairness 17
John Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn
4 Anarchy and public choice 27
Peter T. Leeson
5 Apartheid 33
Art Carden and Christopher Lingle
6 Are voters informed and rational? 37
Donald Wittman
7 Arrow’s theorem and voting rules 45
Nicholas R. Miller
8 Attitudes toward globalization 51
Philipp Harms and Nils D. Steiner
9 Baumol’s cost disease and Leviathan 62
Otto Brøns-Petersen
10 Beauty in politics 70
Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl, and Panu Poutvaara
11 Behavioral symmetry 81
Cameron Tilley, Geoffrey Brennan, and Michael Munger
12 Belief consumption 86
Christian Schubert and Jan Schnellenbach
13 By-product firms 93
Paul Pecorino
14 Candidates’ positions in deterministic multidimensional models 99
Maria Gallego
15 Candidates’ positions in probabilistic multidimensional policy models 107
Maria Gallego
16 Candidates’ positions in multidimensional valence models 115
Maria Gallego
17 Capitalism 123
Art Carden and Ilia Murtazashvili
18 Central bank independence 128
Jakob de Haan
19 Checks and balances in socialist countries 134
Yang Zhou
20 Coase theorem 139
Randall G. Holcombe
21 Coercion 144
Art Carden, John Meadowcroft, and Ilia Murtazashvili
22 Competition (antitrust) policy 152
William F. Shughart II
23 Consequences of globalization 159
Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm
24 Constitutional political economy 167
Georg Vanberg
25 Corruption as a problem in public choice 175
Susan Rose-Ackerman
26 Covering and the uncovered set 181
Nicholas R. Miller
27 Decline of democracy? Part 1 187
Ronald Wintrobe
28 Decline of democracy? Part 2 194
Ronald Wintrobe
29 Democracy and the quality of institutions 199
Pierre-Guillaume Méon
30 Democratic quality and population health 206
Alberto Batinti and Joan Costa-Font
31 Democratization and the threat of revolution 212
Toke S. Aidt and Raphaël Franck
32 Development policy 220
Andreas Freytag and Moritz Wolf
33 Direct democracy 228
John G. Matsusaka
34 A dividend of democracy 235
Thomas Markussen and Jean-Robert Tyran
35 Duverger’s law and the seat product model 244
Nicholas R. Miller
36 Economic freedom: Impact on growth and inequality 252
Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm
37 The economic model of man 259
Martin Paldam
38 Elections and norms of behaviour 264
Marco Giani and Pierre-Guillaume Méon
39 Electoral engineering 271
Uğurcan Evci and Marek M. Kaminski
40 Elinor Ostrom 279
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
41 Expressive choice 284
Colin Jennings
42 Females as policymakers 292
Monika Köppl-Turyna
43 Finance and income inequality 299
Jakob de Haan, Regina Pleninger, and Jan-Egbert Sturm
44 Fiscal equalization 309
Monika Köppl-Turyna
45 Fiscal federalism 314
Christoph A. Schaltegger and Marco Portmann
46 Foreign influence 325
Toke S. Aidt, Facundo Albornoz, and Esther Hauk
47 Government failure as failure of the market for politics 333
Reiner Eichenberger and David Stadelmann
48 Government propaganda 340
Christopher J. Coyne and Yahya Alshamy
49 Grease-the-wheels hypothesis 346
Pierre-Guillaume Méon
50 Group size paradox 355
Paul Pecorino
51 Informal or shadow economy 362
Friedrich Schneider
52 Information in rent-seeking contests 369
Lambert Schoonbeek
53 Institutions and economic growth 374
Francisco José -Veiga
54 International currency 384
Carsten Hefeker
55 International humanitarian aid 390
Andreas Fuchs and Samuel Siewers
56 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Basics 399
Piotr Swistak
57 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Results 403
Piotr Swistak
58 Measures of corruption 407
Nadia Fiorino and Emma Galli
59 Measuring electoral competitiveness: Part 1: Unpredictability 411
Stanley L. Winer
60 Measuring electoral competitiveness: Part 2: Contestability 420
Stanley L. Winer
61 Measuring democracy 425
Tommy Krieger
62 The median voter model 433
Roger D. Congleton
63 Methodological individualism 441
Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
64 Military-industrial complex 447
Christopher J. Coyne and Nathan P. Goodman
65 Mixed electoral systems 454
Jarosław Flis, Marek M. Kaminski, and Jeremiasz Salamon
66 Nonviolent action 462
Joshua Ammons and Christopher J. Coyne
67 Outcomes of partisan politics 468
Klaus Gründler, Niklas Potrafke, and Cameron A. Shelton
68 Partisan gerrymandering 476
Bernard Grofman and Jonathan Cervas
69 Paying “cash-for-votes” 483
Anand Murugesan and Jean-Robert Tyran
70 Political budget cycles: Part 1: From political business to political budget cycles 493
Frank Bohn, Lamar Crombach, and Jan-Egbert Sturm
71 Political budget cycles: Part 2: Conditional national political budget cycles 501
Jakob de Haan and Bram Gootjes
72 Political budget cycles: Part 3: Subnational political budget cycles 513
Francisco José -Veiga and Linda Gonçalves Veiga
73 Political budget cycles: Part 4: Rationality in political budget cycle model 523
Lamar Crombach, Frank Bohn, and Jan-Egbert Sturm
74 Peer effects and social contagion 529
Thomas Apolte and Kim Leonie Kellermann
75 Pocketbook voting 538
Panu Poutvaara and Robert Schwager
76 Political dynasties 548
Maqsood Aslam and Etienne Farvaque
77 Political economy of emerging donors 553
Angelika Budjan and Axel Dreher
78 Political economy of entrepreneurship policy 563
Daniel L. Bennett
79 Political economy of international sanctions 571
Jerg Gutmann, Matthias Neuenkirch, and Florian Neumeier
80 Political fragmentation: Impact on fiscal policy 579
Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm
81 Political legislation cycles 591
Fabio Padovano
82 Political economy of attention 599
Patrick Balles, Ulrich Matter, and Alois Stutzer
83 Political ideology 607
Maite Laméris and Richard Jong-A-Pin
84 Politico-economic models 613
Friedrich Schneider
85 Politics as exchange 619
Randall G. Holcombe
86 Primacy effects 623
Marek M. Kaminski and Steven Linder
87 Prisoner’s Dilemma 629
Piotr Swistak
88 Procyclical fiscal policy 633
Toshihiro Ihori and Keigo Kameda
89 Property rights and public choice 641
Peter T. Leeson and Ennio E. Piano
90 Public choice analysis of European integration 646
Roland Vaubel
91 Public choice and good governance 650
Roger D. Congleton
92 Public choice in the democracy of Ancient Athens 658
George Tridimas
93 Public debt 666
François Facchini
94 Public spending 674
François Facchini
95 Public choice and stadium subsidies 681
John Charles Bradbury, Dennis Coates, and Brad R. Humphreys
96 Public health and public choice 690
Peter T. Leeson and Henry A. Thompson
97 Public sector efficiency 696
Monika Köppl-Turyna
98 Ratchet effect 703
Christopher J. Coyne, Abigail R. Hall, and Matthew A. Owens
99 Relatively absolute absolutes 709
Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
100 Rent seeking 715
Kai A. Konrad
101 Rise of authoritarian populism: A revolt against reason? 722
Ronald Wintrobe
102 Secession as a public choice 729
Martin Rode
103 Shortsightedness effect 738
Joseph Connors and James Gwartney
104 Slavery 742
Art Carden, Phillip W. Magness, John Meadowcroft, and Ilia Murtazashvili
105 Socialism 751
Art Carden, Ilia Murtazashvili, and Anna Claire Flowers
106 Status quo 759
Cameron Tilley and Michael Munger
107 Strategic corporate environmentalism 766
Pim Heijnen
108 Strategic voting 769
Aaron Hamlin, Whitney Hua, and Raquel Centeno
109 Suicide terrorism and martyrdom 776
Mario Ferrero
110 Theocracy 780
Mario Ferrero
111 Threshold public good games 786
Pim Heijnen
112 The transitional gains trap 791
Art Carden and Sarah Moore
113 Trust in financial institutions and central banks 796
Carin van der Cruijsen and Anna Samarina
114 Uncertainty and economic reforms 805
Carsten Hefeker and Michael Neugart
115 US Constitutional Convention 811
Keith Dougherty and Ted Rossier
116 US Electoral College 817
Nicholas R. Miller
117 Voting motives 824
Panu Poutvaara and Robert Schwager
Index 834