Corporate Governance and Firm Organization
Microfoundations and Structural Forms
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP Oxford
- Megjelenés dátuma 2005. december 22.
- ISBN 9780199286799
- Kötéstípus Puhakötés
- Terjedelem416 oldal
- Méret 233x156x23 mm
- Súly 607 g
- Nyelv angol
- Illusztrációk Numerous figures and tables 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
Recent scandals involving large firms, in the US and elsewhere, have brought the role and conduct of the firm to the forefront of public attention.
The corporation has often been seen as a body directed by its shareholders, or stakeholders, whose behaviour is to be influenced by the provision of incentives and regulation. To support this view, Agency Theory has sought to explain how different agents in a firm, with different objectives, produce particular actions. The contributors in this volume develop a new perspective, putting issues surrounding the organization of the firm, such as motivation and cognition, at the heart of the question of corporate governance.
Hosszú leírás:
Recent scandals involving large firms, in the US and elsewhere, have intensified discussion regarding the role and conduct of the corporation. The contributors to this book argue that much of this debate has taken too narrow a view of the issue of corporate governance, and question some of the key assumptions of economic models.
Drawing on insights from a variety of fields, including management studies, organization studies, economics and finance, political science, sociology, psychology, and legal studies, the contributors argue that these models fail to take account of the varied and complex behaviour of actors within the corporation. Instead the organizational, cognitive, and motivational foundations of governance problems and possible solutions are re-worked to produce a broader conception of governance.
The book contains chapters from leading international management scholars, including: Masahiko Aoki, Margaret Blair, John Child, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Bruno Frey, Anna Grandori, Joseph Lampel, Ryon Lancaster, William Lazonick, Siegwart Lindenberg, Patrick Moreton, Margit Osterloh, Michael Piore, Andrea Prencipe, Suzana Rodrigues, Mark Roe, Giuseppe Soda, Steen Thomsen, Brian Uzzi, Paul Windolf, and Todd Zenger.
Corporate Governance and Firm Organization provides an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, and will be essential reading for academics and graduate students of corporate governance, business and management, economics, finance, sociology, and law; Consultants, professionals, and policy-makers working in the area of corporate governance.
An interesting and provocative approach to the study of corporate governance. Those management scholars or newly minted doctoral students who have adopted traditional strategic approaches to corporate governance will want to read this book so that they do not miss the opportunity tto grow in knowledge and understanding in this emerging area.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction: Reframing Corporate Governance: Behavioural Assumptions, Governance Mechanisms, and Societal Effects
Part I: Contingent Structures and Multiple Rightholders: Co-Designing Governance and Organization
A Comparative Institutional Analytic Approach to Corporate Governance
The Forgotten Attraction of the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the Separation of Asset Ownership from Control
Governing with Multiple Principals: An Empirically Based Analysis of Capital Providers' Preferences and Superior Governance Structures
Corporate Governance in International Joint Ventures: Toward a Theory of Partner Preferences
Information Intermediaries' Incentives and Corporate Strategy Choice in the US
Part II: Beyond 'Control and Alignment': Non-Economic Objectives and Relational Governance
Economy, Society, and Worker Representation in Corporate Governance
Corruption, Fraud, and Corporate Governance: A Report on Enron
Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue
Myopic Opportunism and Joint Production: A Relational Approach to Corporate Governance
The Benefit of Doubt: Shadow Norms and Governance in Trust-Based Organizations
The Governance of Innovation: The Case of Rolls-Royce Plc
Part III: Explaining the Difference and Change in Corporate Governance Systems: Beyond the Convergence/Divergence Dilemma
Explaining Western Securities Markets
Convergence of Corporate Governance During the Stock Market Bubble: Towards Anglo-American or European Standards?
The Worldwide Diffusion of Codes of Good Governance
From Colleague to Employee: Determinants of Changing Career Governance Structures in Elite US Law Firms