Beyond Reduction
Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science
Sorozatcím: Philosophy of Mind Series;
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A termék adatai:
- Kiadó OUP USA
- Megjelenés dátuma 2012. március 1.
- ISBN 9780199914692
- Kötéstípus Puhakötés
- Terjedelem242 oldal
- Méret 234x156x13 mm
- Súly 345 g
- Nyelv angol 0
Kategóriák
Rövid leírás:
A positive, alternative approach to mind which sees the philosophy of mind, like the sciences, as cognitive enterprises trying to model local features of the world and ourselves.
TöbbHosszú leírás:
Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding.
In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology.
Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm.
Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Preface
Introduction
Section I -- Naturalism and Reductionism
1. Varieties of Naturalism: What is a Naturalistic Philosophy of Mind?
2. Reduction and Supervenience: The Contemporary Problematic in Philosophy of Mind
3. The Demise of Reductionism in Philosophy of Science
Section II
4. Reductionism and Eliminativism
5. Dualism and the Explanatory Gaps
6. Non-Reductive Physicalism and Mysterianism
Section III -- Cognitive Pluralism
7. Two Types of Pluralism
8. The Scope and Plausibility of Cognitive Pluralist Epistemology
9. Cognitive Pluralism and Modal Metaphysics
10. Cognitive Pluralism and Naturalism
Bibliography
