Why Does Inequality Matter?

Why Does Inequality Matter?

 
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Date of Publication:
 
Normal price:

Publisher's listprice:
GBP 16.99
Estimated price in HUF:
8 206 HUF (7 815 HUF + 5% VAT)
Why estimated?
 
Your price:

7 385 (7 034 HUF + 5% VAT )
discount is: 10% (approx 821 HUF off)
The discount is only available for 'Alert of Favourite Topics' newsletter recipients.
Click here to subscribe.
 
Availability:

 
  Piece(s)

 
 
 
 
Product details:

ISBN13:9780198854883
ISBN10:0198854889
Binding:Paperback
No. of pages:182 pages
Size:215x136x11 mm
Language:English
201
Category:
Short description:

Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. He considers the nature and importance of equality of opportunity, whether the pursuit of greater equality involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and whether the rich can be said to deserve their greater rewards.

Long description:
Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. Demands for greater equality can seem puzzling, because it can be unclear what reason people have for objecting to the difference between what they have and what others have, as opposed simply to wanting to be better off. This book examines six such reasons. Inequality can be objectionable because it arises from a failure of some agent to give equal concern to the interests of different parties to whom it is obligated to provide some good. It can be objectionable because it involves or gives rise to objectionable inequalities in status. It can be objectionable because it gives the rich unacceptable forms of control over the lives of those who have less. It can be objectionable because it interferes with the procedural fairness of economic institutions, or because it deprives some people of substantive opportunity to take part in those institutions. Inequality can be objectionable because it interferes with the fairness of political institutions. Finally, inequality in wealth and income can be objectionable because it is unfair: the institutional mechanisms that produce it cannot be justified in the relevant way. Scanlon's aims is to provide a moral anatomy of these six reasons, and the ideas of equality that they involve. He also examines objections to the pursuit of equality on the ground that it involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and argues that ideas of desert do not provide a basis either for justifying significant economic inequality or for objecting to it.

This book's lengthy discussion of when and why inequality is morally objectionable expertly combines accessibility, subtlety, and sophistication ... the book is clearly written, discusses many arguments in both public debate and academic literature, and develops and assesses various ways in which such arguments can be developed. The main strength of this book is not its novelty, since many arguments can be found in Scanlon's earlier work as well, but the way it summarizes and collects arguments against inequality and presents them in an accessible style. This book is a must read for anyone interested in inequality and social justice.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Equal Concern
Status Inequality
Procedural Fairness
Substantive Opportunity
Political Equality
Equality, Liberty, and Coercion
Desert
Unequal Income
Conclusions