Well-Being
Happiness in a Worthwhile Life
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 24 July 2014
- ISBN 9780195323276
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages264 pages
- Size 165x236x25 mm
- Weight 528 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
This book offers a new argument for the ancient claim that well-being as the highest prudential good -- eudaimonia -- consists of happiness in a life according to virtue. Virtue is a source of happiness, but happiness also requires external goods.
MoreLong description:
This book offers a new argument for the ancient claim that well-being as the highest prudential good -- eudaimonia -- consists of happiness in a virtuous life. The argument takes into account recent work on happiness, well-being, and virtue, and defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue as an integrated intellectual-emotional disposition that is limited in both scope and stability. This conception of virtue is argued to be widely-held and compatible with social and cognitive psychology.
The main argument of the book is as follows: (i) the concept of well-being as the highest prudential good is internally coherent and widely held; (ii) well-being thus conceived requires an objectively worthwhile life; (iii) in turn, such a life requires autonomy and reality-orientation, i.e., a disposition to think for oneself, seek truth or understanding about important aspects of one's own life and human life in general, and act on this understanding when circumstances permit; (iv) to the extent that someone is successful in achieving understanding and acting on it, she is realistic, and to the extent that she is realistic, she is virtuous; (v) hence, well-being as the highest prudential good requires virtue. But complete virtue is impossible for both psychological and epistemic reasons, and this is one reason why complete well-being is impossible.
Badhwar's overall argument and her portrayal of the highest prudential good is powerful, rich, and worth serious consideration.
Table of Contents:
Contents
Acknowledgments
Part I: Well-Being
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Well-Being as the Highest Prudential Good
Chapter 3: Well-Being: From Subjectivity to Objectivity
Part II : Autonomy, Realism, and Virtue
Chapter 4: Autonomy and Reality-Orientation
Chapter 5: Is Realism Really Bad for You? A Realistic Response
Chapter 6: Virtue
Part III: Well-Being and Virtue
Chapter 7: Happy Villains and Stoic Sages, External Goods and the Primacy of Virtue
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Taking Stock
Bibliography
Index