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    The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame

    The Politics of Public Service Bargains by Hood, Christopher; Lodge, Martin;

    Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame

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      • Publisher's listprice GBP 152.50
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    Product details:

    • Publisher OUP Oxford
    • Date of Publication 1 June 2006

    • ISBN 9780199269679
    • Binding Hardback
    • No. of pages240 pages
    • Size 242x164x18 mm
    • Weight 498 g
    • Language English
    • Illustrations tables and figures
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    Short description:

    Providing a novel, analytical perspective on executive government, this timely book examines recent public sector reform policies in a number of countries. The book exposes key dimensions of the relationship between public servants and the wider political system, examining both the formalized and the implicit understandings between the two.

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    Long description:

    The traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains?

    The Politics of Public Service Bargains develops a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, this study examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain - reward, competency and loyalty and responsibility.

    The Politics of Public Service Bargains points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government and suggests how different 'bargains' are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. This study explores the context in which managerial bargains - widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements - are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.

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    Table of Contents:

    Preface
    Part 1: Surveying Public Service Bargains
    Introducing Public Service Bargains
    Trustee-Type Public Service Bargains
    Agency-Type Public Service Bargains
    Part 2: Three Dimensions of Public Service Bargains
    Reward in Public Service Bargains: Pyramids, Nobless Oblige, Turkey Races, and Lotteries of Life
    Comptency in Public Service Bargains: Wonks, Sages, Deliverers, and Go-Betweens
    Loyalty and Responsibility in Public Service Bargains: Judges, Executives, Partners, and Jesters
    Putting the Pieces Together
    Part 3: Blame, Change, and Cheating
    How Public Service Bargains Change and Fall
    Public Service Managerialism and Public Service Bargains: Control, Blame Avoidance, and Cheating
    Conclusion
    Appendixes
    Bibliography

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