The Political Economy of Trust by Farrell, Henry;

Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany

Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics;

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Product details:

Publisher Cambridge University Press
Date of Publication 10 May 2012

ISBN 9781107404304
Binding Paperback
No. of pages258 pages
Size 229x152x15 mm
Weight 380 g
Language English

Short description:

This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - especially informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations.

Long description:

Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-W&&&252;rttemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi.

"Farrell's The Political Economy of Trust is a tour de force. His book takes us through the burgeoning literature on social trust, social capital, institutions, and networks. Farrell has done us a service by clearly distinguishing among these terms, carefully carving out a distinct analytical space for each concept, and identifying their respective explanatory purchase. One of his main goals is to show that the concept of trust provides a deeper understanding of cooperation than institutions by themselves. He succeeds brilliantly.
"Farrell's masterful treatment of the literatures on social capital, culture, and rational choice approaches to institutions provides us with a more complete picture of the causes and consequences of institutions. His case studies of firms in Emilia Romagna, Italy and Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany, along with his final chapter on the Mafia in Sicily provide the ideal material to illustrate his complex ideas and demonstrate their empirical grounding."
-James A. Caporaso, University of Washington

Acknowledgments; 1. Introduction; 2. A theory of institutions and trust; 3. Varieties of capitalism and industrial districts; 4. Trust and institutions in industrial districts; 5. Accounting for change in informal institutions; 6. Informal institutions without trust: relations among Mafiosi in Sicily; 7. Conclusions; Bibliography; Index.

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