The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility
Series: Oxford Handbooks;
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 27 May 2022
- ISBN 9780190679309
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages784 pages
- Size 182x256x53 mm
- Weight 1447 g
- Language English 265
Categories
Short description:
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility.
MoreLong description:
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible.
The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
I. Theories of Responsibility
Instrumentalist Theories of Responsibility
Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability
Attributionist Theories of Responsibility
II. Kinds of Responsibility
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility
III. Dimensions of Responsibility
Responsibility for Acts and Omissions
Degrees of Responsibility
Group Responsibility
IV. Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise
Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples
Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism
V. Skepticism
Illusionism
Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model
Metaskepticism
VI. Blame
Blame and Holding Responsible
Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes
Response-Dependence Accounts of Blameworthiness
VII. Responsibility, Knowledge, and Causation
Ethics is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame
Responsibility and Causation
VIII. Responsibility, Law, and Justice
Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism
Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study
Responsibility and Distributive Justice
IX. Responsibility, Neuroscience, and Psychology
Responsibility and Neuroscience
Responsibility and Consciousness
Responsibility and Situationism
Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility
X. Responsibility, Relationships, and Meaning in Life
Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes
Relationships and Responsibility
Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes
Forgiveness
Reconciliation and he End of Responsibility
Responsibility and Religion
XI. Case Studies
Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction
Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization
Atrocity, Evil, and Responsibility
