The Governor's Dilemma
Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 11 March 2020
- ISBN 9780198855064
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages314 pages
- Size 229x152x17 mm
- Weight 470 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Through twelve case studies, this book introduces a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence.
MoreLong description:
The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect governance relationships face a dilemma: competent intermediaries gain power from the competencies they contribute, making them difficult to control, while efforts to control intermediary behavor limit important intermediary competencies, including expertise, credibility, and legitimacy. Thus, governors can obtain either high intermediary competence or strong control, but not both. This competence-control tradeoff is a common condition of indirect governance, whether governors are domestic or international, public or private, democratic or authoritarian; and whether governance addresses economic, security, or social issues. The empirical chapters analyze the operation and implications of the governor's dilemma in cases involving the governance of violence (e.g., secret police, support for foreign rebel groups, private security companies), the governance of markets (e.g., the Euro crisis, capital markets, EU regulation, the G20), and cross-cutting governance issues (colonial empires, "Trump's Dilemma"). Competence-control theory helps explain many features of governance that other theories cannot: why indirect governance is not limited to principal-agent delegation, but takes multiple forms; why governors create seemingly counter-productive intermediary relationships; and why indirect governance is frequently unstable over time.
Overall, this volume not only advances our theoretical understanding of modes of governance and governance dynamics by putting theoretical "meat" behind when to expect delegation, trusteeship, cooptation, or orchestration to occur but also puts its fingers on crucial political dynamics that occur across the globe that are rooted in the innovative insight that is the governor's dilemma.
Table of Contents:
Part I. Theoretical Framework
Competence-Control Theory: The Challenge of Governing through Intermediaries
Part II. Governing Violence
The Governor's Dilemma in Colonial Empires
The Authoritarian Governor's Dilemma: Controlling the Secret Police in Socialist Poland and East Germany
Competence over Control: The Politics of Multilateral Weapons Inspections
Militias and the Iraqi State: Shifting Modes of Indirect Governance
The Invader's Dilemma: Enlisting Rebel Groups
Governing Private Security Companies: Politics, Dependence and Control
Part III. Governing Markets
Governing Capital Markets
Balancing Competence and Control: Indirect Governance “Triangles” in EU Regulation
Indirect Governance in Global Financial Regulation
Managing the Euro Crisis: Why Enlist the IMF?
Governing Markets in Autocratic Regimes
Part IV. Implications for Democracy
Trump's Dilemma
