• Contact

  • Newsletter

  • About us

  • Delivery options

  • Prospero Book Market Podcast

  • The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives

    The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception by Zeimbekis, John; Raftopoulos, Athanassios;

    New Philosophical Perspectives

      • GET 10% OFF

      • The discount is only available for 'Alert of Favourite Topics' newsletter recipients.
      • Publisher's listprice GBP 112.50
      • The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.

        53 746 Ft (51 187 Ft + 5% VAT)
      • Discount 10% (cc. 5 375 Ft off)
      • Discounted price 48 372 Ft (46 068 Ft + 5% VAT)

    53 746 Ft

    db

    Availability

    printed on demand

    Why don't you give exact delivery time?

    Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.

    Product details:

    • Publisher OUP Oxford
    • Date of Publication 2 July 2015

    • ISBN 9780198738916
    • Binding Hardback
    • No. of pages464 pages
    • Size 236x169x31 mm
    • Weight 832 g
    • Language English
    • 0

    Categories

    Short description:

    A team of leading experts elucidate the nature of the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, according to which our beliefs, desires, and emotions literally affect how we see the world. They connect the topic's multiple and interdisciplinary strands, and reveal the importance of knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception.

    More

    Long description:

    According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.

    More

    Table of Contents:

    The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Overview
    I. DEFINITIONAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
    Cognitive Penetrability: A No-Progress Report
    Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration
    II. MODULARITY, ENCAPSULATION AND IMPENETRABILITY
    Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment
    Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration
    Multisensory Perception and Cognitive Penetration: The Unity Assumption, Thirty Years After
    III. SUBSTANTIVE IMPENETRABILITY AND PENETRABILITY CLAIMS
    Perception versus Conception: The Goldilocks Test
    Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
    Cognitive Penetration of the Dorsal Visual Stream?
    Attention and Cognitive Penetration
    IV. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION
    Looks the same but feels different: A metacognitive approach to cognitive penetrability
    Cognitive Penetrability and Consciousness
    Seeing, Visualizing, and Believing: Pictures and Cognitive Penetration
    V. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT
    Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content
    VI. COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND REALISM
    Perceptual Content, Cognitive Penetrability, and Realism
    Cognitive (Im)penetrability of Vision: Restricting Vision versus Restricting Cognition
    Afterword: Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce
    Index

    More