Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets
How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 4 December 2014
- ISBN 9780199685233
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages546 pages
- Size 223x145x36 mm
- Weight 774 g
- Language English
- Illustrations Figures and Tables 0
Categories
Short description:
This book reviews labor market and tax policies to improve social protection policies in middle income countries, mostly Latin America and Asia. It reviews existing labor market distortions in these countries and analyzes various policy options to help reduce distorted incentives.
MoreLong description:
Most countries implement social protection programs to help individuals manage risks such as unemployment, disability, illness, longevity or death. In many middle income countries, these are often based on a 'Bismarckian model' (named after Otto von Bismarck), where benefits are financed by contributions levied on salaried employment. In countries with a large informal sector, however, only a fraction of the population is covered by this system and non-contributory programs have been added or are planned to increase coverage. This can create distortions in the labor market, and the book is about policies to expand the coverage of social insurance programs to all workers, without reducing incentives to job creation and formal work.
While few would argue against the need and social merits of social insurance and social assistance programs there are growing concerns about their unintended consequences on labor markets because of poor design. The programs can distort incentives and individual behaviors in ways that either reduce employment levels and/or promote informality, ultimately affecting productivity and economic performance. For instance, high social security contribution rates can reduce formal employment; badly designed unemployment benefits can reduce incentives to keep, search, and take jobs; and fragmented social assistance programs can become a tax on formal labor and encourage informality.
The book reviews the evidence regarding the effects of social insurance and social assistance programs on labor market outcomes and discusses options to improve their design and implementation. The book focuses particularly on middle income countries in Latin America and Asia with a large informal sector and suggests ways to reduce these distortions and better manage and finance the subsidies to make coverage universal, while creating good jobs. The book compiles expert papers from the joint conferences of the World Bank (WB), the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on Employment and Development.
Table of Contents:
Overview and Policy Implications
Part I: Social Insurance, Behaviors, and Labor Markets
Evolution of Social Security Systems in Latin America, and Implications for Labor Markets
Effects of Non-Contributory Systems on Informality: Taking Stock of Eight Years of Implementation of Mexico's Seguro Popular
Unemployment Insurance, Job Search, and Informal Employment
Social Insurance Bundles and Formal Employment
Non-contributory Pensions and Informality in Chile
Part II: Defining the Mandate of Social Insurance Programs
How Much Savings or Insurance? The Role of Information, Knowledge and Psychological Factors in Determining the Mandate of Social Insurance Programs
Inconsistent Time Preferences and Savings: The Case of Chile
Part III: Designing Redistributive Arrangements
Redistributing Income while Reducing Distortions in Labor Markets
Poverty Impacts of Targeted and Untargeted Programs under Budget Constraints
Assessing Implicit Redistribution in Pension Systems within Social Insurance Systems: The Case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay
Part IV: Financing Social Insurance
Financing Instruments, Behaviors, and Labor Market Outcomes
Reducing the Tax-Wedge in Latin American Countries
Financing Health Insurance and Pensions through VAT
