Skepticism About the External World
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41 989 Ft
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 9 July 1998
- ISBN 9780195117196
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages192 pages
- Size 236x157x20 mm
- Weight 499 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Do we know or even have evidence that external material objects exist? Butchvarov offers a highly original approach to this perennial philosophical issue. He argues that only a direct realist view of perception - the view that in perception we are directly aware of material objects - has any hope of providing a compelling response to the sceptic. His radical innovation is to insist that the direct object of perceptual and even dreaming and hallucinatory experience is always a material object, but not necessarily one that actually exists. This leads to a metaphysics in which reality is ultimately constructed by human decisions out of objects that are ontologically more basic but which cannot be said in themselves to be either real or unreal.
MoreLong description:
One of the most important and perennially debated philosophical questions is whether we can have knowledge of the external world. Butchvarov here considers whether and how scepticism with regard to such knowledge can be refuted or at least answered. He argues that only a direct realist view of perception has any hope of providing a compelling response to the sceptic and introduces the radical innovation that the direct object of perceptual, and even dreaming and hallucinatory, experience is always a material object, but not necessarily one that actually exists. This leads him to a metaphysics in which reality is ultimately constructed by human decisions out of objects that are ontologically more basic but which cannot be said in themselves to be either real or unreal.
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