Plato's Moral Psychology
Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 7 December 2017
- ISBN 9780198798446
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages242 pages
- Size 218x148x21 mm
- Weight 444 g
- Language English 0
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Short description:
Rachana Kamtekar offers a new understanding of Plato's account of the soul and its impact on our living well or badly, virtuously or viciously. She argues that throughout the dialogues Plato maintains that human beings have a natural desire for our own good, and that actions and conditions contrary to this desire are involuntary.
MoreLong description:
Plato's Moral Psychology is concerned with Plato's account of the soul and its impact on our living well or badly, virtuously or viciously. The core of Plato's moral psychology is his account of human motivation, and Rachana Kamtekar argues that throughout the dialogues Plato maintains that human beings have a natural desire for our own good, and that actions and conditions contrary to this desire are involuntary (from which follows the 'Socratic paradox' that wrongdoing is involuntary).
Our natural desire for our own good may be manifested in different ways: by our pursuit of what we calculate is best, but also by our pursuit of pleasant or fine things - pursuits which Plato assigns to distinct parts of the soul. Kamtekar develops a very different interpretation of Plato's moral psychology from the mainstream interpretation, according to which Plato first proposes that human beings only do what we believe to be the best of the things we can do ('Socratic intellectualism') and then in the middle dialogues rejects this in favour of the view that the soul is divided into parts with some good-dependent and some good-independent motivations ('the divided soul').
Rachana Kamtekar has already won a niche for herself through a series of articles on Plato that are not only ingenious and original (as is now de rigueur, and often enough achieved), but also genuinely perceptive. This, her first book, pursues a seminal idea through a plurality of Platonic dialogues. An introduction helpfully highlights what is central and salient, and outlines what is to come; later résumés keep the reader on track. The result should enhance anyone's appreciation and enjoyment of these familiar yet elusive texts.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Doctrine and Dialectic in Plato's Dialogues
Psychology for Sophists
Why is wrongdoing unwilling?
The Divided Soul
Why is the Divided Soul Tripartite?
Psychological Eudaemonism and Explanation
