NATO's Lessons in Crisis
Institutional Memory in International Organizations
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 10 May 2018
- ISBN 9780190672171
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages292 pages
- Size 160x236x22 mm
- Weight 550 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
How do international organizations develop institutional memory from their failures? As this book argues, the learning infrastructure in these organizations often disincentivizes error reporting -- prompting elites to informally share knowledge via networks. Drawing on interviews and an experiment with 120 NATO elite officials, this book reveals the importance of institutional design in making or breaking a learning organization.
MoreLong description:
Errors in crisis management operations can have deadly consequences. Some international organizations take steps to reform, whereas other organizations tend to repeat the same errors. As budget cuts have led to increased turnover in personnel, how is it that international organizations have maintained any knowledge about past errors?
This book introduces an argument for how and why international organizations develop institutional memory of strategic errors. As Heidi Hardt shows, formal learning processes -- such as lessons learned offices and databases - can ironically deter elite officials from using the processes to share their relevant knowledge. Elites have few professional incentives to report observed strategic errors. As a result, most memory-building occurs behind the scenes via informal processes. These informal processes include elites' use of transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation, and conversations during crisis management exercises. Such processes ensure that institutional memory develops, but they do so at a price: an organization's memory is vulnerable to knowledge loss if even one critical elite chooses to retire.
Hardt tests her argument through extensive, original field research inside one of the world's largest crisis management organizations -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She conducted interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites, including almost all NATO ambassadors and military representatives, all assistant secretary generals, and civilian and military leaders engaged in the decision-making and planning of operations. Her findings provide insights into NATO's institutional memory concerning three cases of crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine. Ultimately, this book argues that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for an organization to capture knowledge, learn and change.
Table of Contents:
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1: Lessons in Failure: Institutional Memory of Strategic Errors
Chapter 2: T?te ? t?te: The Informal Development of Institutional Memory
Chapter 3: Dilemmas in Design: Constraints on Sharing Knowledge of Errors
Chapter 4: See No Evil: Reflections on Errors in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine
Chapter 5: Hear No Evil: The Informal Processes of Sharing Knowledge of Errors
Chapter 6: Speak No Evil: The Sources that Spur Knowledge Sharing of Errors
Chapter 7: A Reactive Culture: Why the Informal Development of Memory Persists
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Toward Total Recall in Crisis Management
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index
