Moral Animals
Ideals and Constraints in Moral Theory
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 28 June 2007
- ISBN 9780199228096
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages334 pages
- Size 233x155x19 mm
- Weight 521 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Moral Animals offers a brand new approach to moral theory. Drawing on anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary theory, as well as philosophy of language and philosophy of science, Catherine Wilson shows how to understand and reconcile our moral aspirations for a just world with the constraints human nature places on us. This ambitious book will spark fresh debates within philosophy and across the social sciences.
MoreLong description:
In Moral Animals Catherine Wilson develops a theory of morality based on two fundamental premises: first that moral progress implies the evolution of moral ideals involving restraint and sacrifice; second that human beings are outfitted by nature with selfish motivations, intentions, and ambitions that place constraints on what morality can demand of them. Normative claims, she goes on to show, can be understood as projective hypotheses concerning the conduct of realistically-described nonideal agents in preferred fictional worlds. Such claims differ from empirical hypotheses, insofar as they cannot be verified by observation and experiment. Yet many, though not all, moral claims are susceptible of confirmation to the extent that they command the agreement of well-informed inquirers.
With this foundation in place, Wilson turns to a defence of egalitarianism intended to address the objection that the importance of our non-moral projects, our natural acquisitiveness and partiality, and our meritocratic commitments render social equality a mere abstract ideal. Employing the basic notion of a symmetrical division of the co-operative surplus, she argues that social justice with respect to global disparities in well-being, and in the condition of women relative to men, depends on the relinquishment of natural and acquired advantage that is central to the concept of morality.
Review from previous edition Wilson's book engages, in an energetic and constructive way, with many of the main theorists of moral philosophy . . . It is a thoughtful and well-written book.
Table of Contents:
Morality as a System of Advantage-Reducing Imperatives
Paraworlds and Confirmation
Limits on Theory I: Costs to Agents
Limits on Theory II: Immanent Standpoints
The Anonymity Requirement and Counterweight Principles
The Division of the Co-operative Surplus
The Role of a Merit Principle in Distributive Justice
Moral Equality and 'Natural' Subordination
Bibliography
Index
