Mind and Morality
An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology
- Publisher's listprice GBP 132.50
-
63 301 Ft (60 287 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 6 330 Ft off)
- Discounted price 56 971 Ft (54 258 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
63 301 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher Clarendon Press
- Date of Publication 1 August 1996
- ISBN 9780198235897
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages276 pages
- Size 224x144x21 mm
- Weight 477 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
John Bricke presents an original interpretative study of the theory of moral psychology developed by the great British philosopher David Hume, and shows that it presents a powerful challenge to rival theories of mind and morality that are Hume conference flyer, Cambridge Sept 00 AP 14/10/00
MoreLong description:
John Bricke presents a philosophical study of the theory of mind and morality that David Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. The chief elements in the theory of mind are Hume's accounts of reasons for action and of the complex interrelations of desire, volition, and affection. On this basis, Professor Bricke lays out and defends Hume's thoroughgoing non-cognitivist theory of moral judgement, and shows that cognitivist and standard sentimentalist readings of Hume are unsatisfactory, as are the usual interpretations of his views on the connections between morality, justice, and convention.
Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. He represents moral desires as prior to the other moral sentiments. Morality, he holds, in part presupposes conventions for mutual interest; it is not, however, itself a matter of convention.
Mind and Morality demonstrates that Hume's sophisticated moral conativism sets a challenge that recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement cannot readily meet, and his subtle treatment of the interplay of morality and convention suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.
Bricke's discussion of the arguments by which Hume seeks to establish these important conclusions is subtle and illuminating. He also argues convincingly that, for Hume, the convention-bound does not exhaust the morally significant ... His detailed analysis of Hume's arguments raises issues of interpretative and more general philosophical interest throughout, and even where one might be inclined to dispute his account of Hume there is much to be learned.
