Legitimation by Constitution
A Dialogue on Political Liberalism
Series: Oxford Constitutional Theory;
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 22 November 2021
- ISBN 9780192855121
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages208 pages
- Size 242x164x18 mm
- Weight 470 g
- Language English 264
Categories
Short description:
"Legitimation by constitution" is a phrase coined by Michelman and Ferrara to represent an idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of reliance on a dualist democracy: ground-level laws are subject to the constraints of a legal constitution that all citizens, across the political spectrum, can accept as a framework for their collective politics.
MoreLong description:
"Legitimation by Constitution" is the phrase, coined by distinguished authors Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara, for a key idea in Rawlsian political liberalism of a reliance on a dualist form of democracy-a subjection of ground-level lawmaking to the constraints of a higher-law constitution that most citizens could find acceptable as a framework for their politics-as a response to the problem of maintaining a liberally just, stable, and oppression-free democratic government in conditions of pluralist visionary conflict.
Legitimation by Constitution recalls, collects, and combines a series of exchanges over the years between Michelman and Ferrara, inspired by Rawls' encapsulation of this conception in his proposed liberal principle of legitimacy. From a shared standpoint of sympathetic identification with the political-liberal statement of the problem, for which legitimation by constitution is proposed as a solution, these exchanges consider the perceived difficulties arguably standing in the way of this proposal's fulfillment on terms consistent with political liberalism's defining ideas about political justification. The authors discuss the mysteries of a democratic constituent power; the tensions between government-by-the-people and government-by-consent; the challenges posed to concretization by judicial authorities of national constitutional law; and the magnification of these tensions and challenges under the lenses of ambition towards transnational legal ordering. These discussions engage with other leading contemporary theorists of liberal-democratic constitutionalism including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Jürgen Habermas.
Table of Contents:
Part I: Popular Sovereignty Versus Higher (and Higher) Law
"Always Under Law"
On the Paradox of Deliberative Democracy
The Challenge of "Most Reasonable for Us"
The "Most Reasonable for Us" or "Irrescusability" as Preserving Authenticity
Part II: A Democratic Horizon
Constitutional Interpretation: A Dualist Democrat's Dilemma
On Reconciling the Two Understandings of Judicial Review
Judicial Constitutional Application: A Rejoinder
Backgrounding the Debate: Judicial Occlusion and Remedial Strategies
Part III: Global Orders and Limits of Liberalism
Hyperpluralized Constituencies: The Challenge for Political Liberalism
Can Legitimation by Constitution Apply Beyond the State?
A Political Conception of People (and its Consequences)
From Decency to Democracy: Leading by Example
Conclusion
A Glance Back and the Road Ahead
A Liberal Limit to Constitutional Thinness
