Product details:
ISBN13: | 9780198865636 |
ISBN10: | 0198865635 |
Binding: | Hardback |
No. of pages: | 304 pages |
Size: | 241x159x22 mm |
Weight: | 1 g |
Language: | English |
285 |
Category:
Justification as Ignorance
An Essay in Epistemology
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Date of Publication: 9 March 2021
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Short description:
Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone.
Long description:
Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.
Rosenkranz is meticulous in laying the groundwork of a theory. He establishes that propositional justification is a feature of one's epistemic situation, rather than of one's beliefs, hence nonfactive. He further develops a multimodal epistemic logic to show that the luminosity of propositional justification entails the luminosity of doxastic justification.
Rosenkranz is meticulous in laying the groundwork of a theory. He establishes that propositional justification is a feature of one's epistemic situation, rather than of one's beliefs, hence nonfactive. He further develops a multimodal epistemic logic to show that the luminosity of propositional justification entails the luminosity of doxastic justification.
Table of Contents:
Preface
Outline of a Theory of Justification
Principles of Epistemic Logic I: Knowledge
On Being in a Position to Know
Principles of Epistemic Logic II: Being in a Position to Know
Two Systems of Epistemic Logic
Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Applications
Competing Views
Grounds for Justification
What's Wrong with Internalism?
Concluding Remarks
Appendix: The Luminosity of Some Non-Trivial Condition
Outline of a Theory of Justification
Principles of Epistemic Logic I: Knowledge
On Being in a Position to Know
Principles of Epistemic Logic II: Being in a Position to Know
Two Systems of Epistemic Logic
Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Applications
Competing Views
Grounds for Justification
What's Wrong with Internalism?
Concluding Remarks
Appendix: The Luminosity of Some Non-Trivial Condition