Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Series: Clarendon Lectures in Economics;
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23 929 Ft (22 790 Ft + 5% VAT)
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23 929 Ft
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 5 October 1995
- ISBN 9780198288817
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages240 pages
- Size 215x139x14 mm
- Weight 301 g
- Language English
- Illustrations line figures 0
Categories
Short description:
Oliver Hart's Clarendon Lectures are an important contribution to contact theory as it is developing in economic analysis, and especially in the context of the firm. He starts by developing a general model of the firm, and then analyses in greater depth the financial structure of firms, debt collecting and bankruptcy. The book will interest teachers, graduate students and advanced students in microeconomics, the theory of the firm, industrial organization and finance.
MoreLong description:
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Mr Hart provides some impressive insights. Other economists will no doubt be indebted to him.
