Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation
Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs;
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Product details:
- Publisher Clarendon Press
- Date of Publication 17 May 1990
- ISBN 9780198248347
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages240 pages
- Size 224x142x20 mm
- Weight 440 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
This book casts new light on the debate about moral responsibility and determinism. The author explores the relationship between deprivation and desert, argues that the traditional view of the debate should be abandoned, and suggests acceptance of a new compatibilist approach which will meet the needs of justice more fully than the usual proposals.
MoreLong description:
This book casts new light on the classic dispute between `compatibilists' and `incompatibilists' about determinism and moral responsibility. Martha Klein argues that the traditional account of the dispute, turning as it does on the notion of the agent's `ability to have acted otherwise', misrepresents the real disagreement, which arises from the compatibilists' conviction that it is sufficient for blameworthiness that an agent's wrongdoing was the result of a morally reprehensible frame of mind, and the incompatibilists' insistence that wrongdoers cannot be morally responsible for their actions if they are not responsible for their motivating desires and beliefs. The incompatibilist position seems compelling when, for instance, we consider wrongdoers whose desires and attitudes can be traced to early emotional deprivation. The author argues that our response to these and other `problem cases' commits us to an incompatibilist condition for blameworthiness which is actually unfulfillable. In her view, however, some reflections on emotional deprivation should also encourage acceptance of a compatibilist condition which will satisfy our desire to be just more fully than the usual proposals emanating from either side of the debate.
`excellent book ... a significant contribution to age-old discussions of freedom, responsibility and determinism'
Times Literary Supplement
Table of Contents:
Introduction; The compatabilist and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition; Frankfurt, van Inwagen and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition; The compatabilist, the could-have-acted-otherwise condition and the U-condition; Are we committed to a U-condition for blameworthiness?; Can the U-condition for blameworthiness be fulfilled?; What should we do about our commitment to the U-condition?; A compatabilist principle for just blaming; Appendix; Index; Bibliography
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